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THE SCOPE OF REVIEW IN ENGLISH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
BERNARD

SCHWARTZ*

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The scope of judicial review of administrative action in the
Anglo-American world has been dominated by the distinction between "law" and "fact," a distinction that is fundamental throughout our law and that has, indeed, been the keystone upon which our
whole system of appellate review has been built. As Sir Carleton
Allen puts it, in this field, "it is generally agreed that the jurisdiction of superior Courts should be invoked only on questions of law
-a principle which is already familiar in other spheres, such as
appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal and cases stated to the
High Court by justices and other authorities of inferior jurisdiction.
To re-open all disputed issues of fact might lead to endless litigation,
with no very satisfactory conclusion in the end."'- As applied to the
field of administrative law, this separation of law and fact sounds
attractively simple. "The administrative tribunal would find the
facts and the courts would not interfere unless the absence of evidence or the perversity of the finding required them to intervene."The approach of the courts to the scope of review has been based
almost entirely upon this distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact. As to the latter, the primary responsibility of decision is with the administrative expert. It is only the former that are
to be decided judicially "If the action rests upon an administrative
determination-an exercise of judgment in an area which [the
has entrusted to the agency--of course it must not
legislature]
be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different
determination were it empowered to do so. But if the action is based
upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing authority of
the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency
has misconceived the law "3
From an historical point of view, the use of the law-fact distinction in the field of review of administrative action was a wholly
natural development. When Anglo-American courts came to be
confronted with cases involving challenges to the legality of agency
*Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law,
New York University.
1. Allen, Law and Orders 159 (1945).
2. Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law 108 (1941).
3. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. S0,

94 (1943).
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acts, they had at their disposition the fully developed law of appellate review of lower courts as well as that governing the respective roles of judge and jury, both of which were grounded entirely
on the law-fact distinction. In evolving the law of agency review,
it was not surprising that the judges proceeded, so far as possible,
by analogy, with the principles that had been constructed so
meticulously by their predecessors in the above-mentioned fields,
and particularly that of appellate court review In their origins, indeed, cases involving review of agency action by the Court of King's
Bench appear to have been treated exactly like cases involving
review of inferior courts by that tribunal. The prerogative writs
themselves, which became the basic non-statutory method of securing review of administrative acts in the common-law world, were
originally available only to control inferior courts. When those
same writs began to be used as a means of controlling administrative agencies, it was natural for them to be governed by the rules
that applied when they were issued against lower courts, including
that limiting the scrutiny of the reviewing court to questions of law
The law-fact distinction, whose penetration into the law of judicial review of administrative action can thus be explained historically, may also be said to have a significant practical basis in the field
of administrative law A theory of review grounded upon the distiction rests upon a division of labor between judge and administrator
giving full play to the particular competence of each. Questions of
law are to be decided judicially, for the judge, both by training and
tradition, is best equipped to deal with them. "Our desire to have
courts determine questions of law is related to a belief in their
possession of expertness with regard to such questions."' These
considerations do not apply to the judicial review of the factual
issues arising out of administrative determinations. There, the advantages of expertise are with the administrator.
The fact "findings of an expert commission have a validity to
which no judicial examination can pretend, the decision, for instance, of the New York Public Service Commission that a gas
company ought to provide gas service for a given district is almost
inevitably more right than a decision pronounced by the Courts in a
similar case. '' i
ERROR OF LAW

Until recently, it might have been contended that the above
analysis, while doubtless substantially correct so far as the American
4. Landis, The Administrative Process 152 (1938) (emphasis omitted)
5. Laski, A Grammar of Politics 393 (4th ed. 1938)
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system was concerned, did not accurately state the position in
English administrative law. For it had come to be assumed in
Britain that unless broadened by statute, the scope of review of
administrative action depended, not upon the distinction between
law and fact, but upon that between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors.
The law of judicial review in the common-law world has in large
part, developed from the law of ultra vires. Review has been based
on the theory "That every public officer has marked out for him by
law a certain area of 'jurisdiction.' Within the boundaries of this
area he can act freely according to his own discretion, and the
courts will respect his action as final and not inquire into its rightfulness. But if he oversteps those bounds, then the courts will intervene. In this form, the law of court review of public officers becomes simply a branch of the law of ultra vires. The only question
before the court is one of jurisdiction, and the court has no control
of the officer's exercise of discretion within that jurisdiction."
Under this theory, judicial review of administrative action is focused
primarily on the issue of jurisdiction. If the administration acts
within its jurisdiction, its action is not subject to judicial correction. "Inferior jurisdictions could be checked whenever they acted
in excess or want of jurisdiction. So too administrative acts will be
declared illegal by the Courts if there is no jurisdiction to carry
7
them out."1
Certiorari is, in the absence of statute, the most commonly used
remedy to obtain judicial review of administrative action in the
English system. There is little doubt that certiorari, as it was developed by the Court of King's Bench, was based upon the jurisdictional theory of review just outlined. It is, however, a mistake to
assume that review under certiorari extends only to the bare question of jurisdiction, using that term in its narrow sense of the
marking off of the area of power of the agency concerned.8 "It
must be apparent," asserted an American court almost a century
ago with regard to the scope of its review power in an action for a
writ of ceriorari, "that if the superior court could only examine into
the right of the inferior one to enter upon an inquiry, without reference to the manner in which that inquiry is conducted, this remedy
would be of small account."9 The office of cerioran, as it developed,
6. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 41

(1927).
7 Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law 205 (1952).
8. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7.
9. Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 118 (1860).
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was to inquire into something more than the bare jurisdictional
question. The supervision of the reviewing court. according to
Lord Sumner, "goes to two points one is the area of the inferior
jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise,
the other is the observance of the law in the course of its exercise.'""'
And, as Lord Justice Denning informs us, until about a centurv
ago, certiorari was regularly used to correct errors of law on the
tace of the record, even though such errors were committed by a
tribunal acting within the area of jurisdiction marked out for it by
the law "I

More recently, there has been a tendency among English lawyer,
and judges to forget this extension of certiorari for the correction
of non-jurisdictional errors of law "Of recent years," states the
learned judge just cited, "the scope of certiorari seems to have been
somewhat forgotten. It has been supposed to be confined to the
correction of excess of jurisdiction, and not to extend to the correction of errors of law, and several judges have said as much.""'
The development referred to by Denning, L. J., had, indeed, gone
so far that a member of the Court of Appeal, could declare, in reply
to the claim of counsel that it was a general principle that a superior
court would set aside the decision of an inferior tribunal if that
decision contained on the face of it an error of law, that "I do not
think there is any such general principle."'" On the contrary, a,
stated in a frequently referred to passage by Greer L. J., "\\here
the proceedings are regular upon their face and the magistrates had
jurisdiction, the court will not grant the writ of certiorari on the
ground that the court below has misconceived a point of law ""
The 1951 decision of the Court of Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal" makes it clear that such restricted views of the scope of certiorari are erroneous. The applicant in the Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal case
had lost his employment as clerk to a local hospital board in consequence of the enactment of the National Health Service Act, 1040.
The relevant local authority awarded him compensation for the loss
of his employment, but did so only on the basis of his service on the
hospital board, rejecting his claim that the whole of his local gov
10. Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd., [19221 2 A. C. 128, 156.
11. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1
K. B. 338, 348 (1951)
12. Ibid.
13. Racecourse Betting Control Board v. Secretary for t\ir, [19441 Ch
114, 124 (C.A. 1943)
14. Rex v. Minister of Health, [1939] 1 K. B. 232, 246.
15. [1952] 1 K. B. 338 (1951)

1956]

ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

ernment service should be taken into account. The applicant appealed to the compensation award tribunal, which, under the law,
had the function of determining the compensation payable to officers of hospital boards who lost their employment by reason of the
transfer of hospitals to the Minister of Health under the 1946 Act.
The tribunal dismissed the appeal and the applicant sought certiorari
to quash its decision on the ground that the tribunal had erred in law
in computing the compensation to which he was entitled on the
basis of his service only as an officer of the hospital board. Before
the Divisional Court, it was admitted by counsel for the tribunal
that the tribunal had erred in its method of computation, but,
though conceding that such error was one of law on the face of the
decision, he contended that certiorari would lie to such a statutory
tribunal only in the case of want or excess of jurisdiction. According to his claim as stated by one member of the Court of Appeal,
"The statutory tribunals, like this one here, are often made the
judges of both fact and law, with no appeal to the High Court. If,
then, the King's Bench should interfere when a tribunal makes a
mistake of law, the King's Bench may well be said to be exceeding
its own jurisdiction. It would be usurping to itself an appellate
jurisdiction which has not been given to it."' '
There was thus presented squarely the question of the correctness of the view, already stated, that the scope of certiorari was
limited to the correction of jurisdictional errors in the narrow sense.
"The question in this case," declares Denning, L. J., "is whether
the Court of King's Bench can intervene to correct the decision of
a statutory tribunal which is erroneous in point of law No one has
ever doubted that the Court of King's Bench can intervene to prevent a statutory tribunal from exceeding the jurisdiction which
Parliament has conferred on it, but it is quite another thing to say
that the King's Bench can intervene when a tribunal makes a mistake of law. A tribunal may often decide a point of law wrongly
whilst keeping well within its jurisdiction. If it does so, can the
King's Bench intervene ?117
In answering this question in the affirmative, the Court of Appeal was strongly influenced by the fact that a negative response on
its part would have meant the perpetuation of the rank injustice
inflicted upon the applicant. The administrative decision which he
challenged was based upon an error of law which counsel for the
tribunal frankly acknowledged. "It is an error which deprives Mr.
16. Id. at 346, per Denning, L. J.
17 Ibid.
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Shaw of the compensation to which he is by law entitled. So long
as the erroneous decision stands, the compensating authority dare
not pay Mr. Shaw the money to which he is entitled lest the auditor
should surcharge them. It would be quite intolerable if in such case
there were no means of correcting the error." '
In holding that an order of certiorari could be granted to quash
an administrative decision on the ground of error of law, the Court
of Appeal was not really extending the scope of review in a certiorari proceeding. "When the King's Bench exercises its control
over tribunals in this way, it is not usurping a jurisdiction which
does not belong to it. It is only exercising a jurisdiction which it has
always had."'" Those lawyers and judges (however eminent some
of them may have been) who supported the view that certiorari was
confined to the correction of jurisdictional errors had forgotten the
basic historical facts with regard to the supervisory position of the
King's Bench. As Lord justice Denning has affirmed, "the Court of
King's Bench has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior
tribunals, not in an appellate capacity, but in a supervisory capacity
This control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals
keep within their jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe
the law "20 Control by the courts which does not extend to administrative decisions which, on their face, offend against the law
would be but illusory, much as sounding brass or a tinkling
cymbal 2 1 By its decision that errors of law could be inquired into
in certiorari proceedings, the Court of Appeal was only returning to
the amplitude which the writ of certiorari clearly had in earlier
times. It should not be forgotten that, under the customary wording
of the old writ, the record of the inferior tribunal was ordered to
be sent up so that the King's Bench might cause to be done thereon
"what of right and according to the law and custom of England"
22

ought to be done.

It is because of its express rejection of the heresy that a court
upon review, need not quash an administrative decision tainted by
an error of law that the Northumberland Compensation Appeal
Tribunal case well justifies its characterization by Lord Justice
Morris in a public lecture "as being a very important one-and I so
regard it. That is because the controlling powers which can be
18. Id. at 354, per Denning, L. J.
19. Id. at 347, per Denning, L. J.

20. Id. at 346.

21. The phrase used in National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire
& Rubber Co., 161 F 2d 798, 804 (5th Cir. 1947).
22. See Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [19521
1 K. B. at 347
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exercised by the Queen's Bench Division over inferior courts by
orders of certiorari or prohibition form so vital a part in our legal
and constitutional system in ensunng that statutory tribunals do not
act in excess of jurisdiction and in correcting errors of law. In recent
years there had been a tendency to consider that certiorari was confined to the correction of the results of acting in excess of jurisdiction. It has been made plain that certiorari can be used to correct
errors of law which appear on the face of the record."23
"SPEAKING ORDER" DOCTRINE

In the Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal case
just discussed, the order of the tribunal at issue indicated on its face
that it was based upon an error of law. "I base my opinion" declares
Lord Justice Singleton, "that there is error on the face of the decision on the terms of the decision itself; it is a 'speaking order'.
read alongside the regulations, it shows that the tribunal declined to
consider any service other than service with the hospital board."2It was the fact that the administrative decision itself "spoke" its
error of lawv 5 that enabled the reviewing court to set it aside for,
as Denning, L. J., pointed out, "throughout all the cases there is
one governing rule: Certiorari is only available to quash a decision
for error of law if the error appears on the face of the record." -0
In a case like Rex v. Northumberland Compensatson .Appeal
Tribunal, the error of law will not appear on the face of the record
unless the administrative agency itself chooses to have it so appear.
The record in certiorari cases, the judge just cited informs us,
"must contain at least the document which initiates the proceedings, the pleadings, if any; and the adjudication, but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate
them.'" -7 If, in a given case, the agency concerned is unwilling to
set forth the grounds of its decision in its order, certiorari will, as
a practical matter, prove a worthless remedy, for there will, in the
vast majority of cases, be no error on the face which the court's
order can reach. In such a case, states Lord Sumner, the administrative tribunal, by keeping silent, has not, in theory perhaps, been able to "stint the jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench or
alter the actual law of certiorari. N'rhat it did was to disarm its
23. Mlorris, The Courts and Domestic Tribunals, 69 L. Q. Rev. 318. 329
(1953).
24. [1952] 1 K. B. at 345.
25. Id. at 355, per Morris. L. J.
26. Id. at 351.
27 Id. at 352.
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exercise. The effect was not to make that which had been error,
error no longer, but to remove nearly all opportunity for its detection. The face of the record 'spoke' no longer, it was the inscrutable
28
face of a sphinx."
For the reviewing court to be able effectively to intervene, the
administrative tribunal "in making its order, should not make it
an unspeaking or unintelligible order, but should in some way state
upon the face of the order, the elements which had led to the
decision. 1 9 The words quoted are from a noted opinion of Lord
Cairns, L. C., in which he laid down the distinction between socalled "speaking" and "unspeaking" orders, which under the Northumberland CompensationAppeal Tribunal case, has become of basic
importance in the English law of scope of review According to
Lord Goddard, C. J., when Lord Cairns, in the passage just cited,
"speaks of an unspeaking or unintelligible order, he obviously means
an order which gives no reasons, or does not explain in any way
why the [inferior] court made the order, but simply states that the
court made such-and-such a conviction, order for removal or for
quashing the poor rate, or other order of that sort, giving no
reasons for doing so. It may not be unintelligible in one sense, hlut
it is unintelligible in that it does not tell the superior court why the
inferior court made that order. ' 30 On the other hand if, the inferior
court or tribunal states in its order what led to its decision, that
makes the order a "speaking" one, which can be criticized oii
certiorari. 31 If the tribunal "stated upon the face of the order, by
way of recital, that the facts were so and so, ard the grounds of its
decision were such as were so stated, then the order became uponi
the face of it, a speaking order, and if that which was stated upon
the face of the order, in the opinion of any party, was not such as
to warrant the order, then that party might go to the Court of
Queen's Bench and point to the order as one which told its own
story, and ask the Court of Queen's Bench to remove it by certiorari,
and when so removed to pass judgment upon it, whether it should
or should not be quashed.

8 2

In order to understand the significance of the "speaking order"
doctrine in English administrative law, one should bear in mind the
28. Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 128, 159.
29. Overseers of the Poor of Walsall v. London and North Western
Railway Co. (1878), 4 App. Cas. 30, 40.
30. Rex v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [19511
1 K. B. 711, 718.
31. Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 128, 155.
32. Overseers of the Poor of Walsall v. London and North Western
Railway Co. (1878), 4 App. Cas. 30, 40.
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fundamental principle that, unless required to do so by statute,
administrative agencies m Britain are under no legal obligation to
give those affected any reasons for their decisions. It is only where
the agency concerned chooses to articulate the bases of its action
that its order becomes a "speaking" order and hence subject to
being quashed by certiorari. "If the tribunal does state its reasons,
and those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the
decision." 33 In the majority of cases, the orders of English administrative agencies appear to be "unspeaking" ones, in such cases,
where no reasons are given, certiorari will be of little avail, even
though the agency may have acted upon a misconception of the law.
As Lord Goddard, C. J., puts it, with regard to review of an inferior court, "If the order is merely a statement of conviction and
that there shall be a fine of 40 s., or an order of removal or quashing
a poor rate, there is an end of it, this court cannot examine further." 4 What the Lord Chief Justice says in this passage is true
as well in the vast majority of cases where administrative decisions
are "unspeaking"; in such cases, too, the courts cannot examine
further than the face of the challenged agency orders, which, as a
practical 5matter, "speak" only with the "inscrutable face of a
3
sphinx."
In the opinion of the present writer, the "speaking order" doctrine constitutes an unwarranted and illogical restriction of the
scope of judicial review in English administrative law. According to
the authors of a leading treatise, "It is characteristic of the haphazard and illogical state of the law of judicial control that the
effectiveness of review may depend on the readiness of tribunals to
volunteer written reasons for their decisions."30 Under the "speaking order" doctrine, if administrative agencies, in Lord Sumner's
phrase, "state more than they are bound to state, it may, so to
speak, be used against them, and out of their own mouths they may
be condemned." 8 7 In other words, the administrator who adheres to
the spirit of fair play and gives the private citizen affected by his
decision the reasons for the decision may be penalized by the ultimate quashing of that decision, if the reasons given are erroneous in
law; the administrator who observes only the letter of the law and
33. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [19523

1 K. B. at 352. See, similarly, Pilling v. Abergele Urban District Council,

[1950] 1 K. B. 636.

34. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1951] 1

K. B. 711, 718.
35. Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 128, 159.
36. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 214.
37

Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 128, 155.
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gives no reasons, unless he is compelled to do so by statute, will
normally suffer no such consequences.
The "speaking order" doctrine constitutes one of the great barriers to effective judicial control of administrative action in the
English system. Except where agencies are required by law to
give reasons for their decisions (and, it should be noted, the Coimittee on Ministers' Powers was strongly in favor of such a requirement), that doctrine, in effect, places administrative decisions beyond the reach of reviewing courts, at least in certiorari proceedings. As a recent report puts it, if the administrative "tribunal fails
to set out any facts or reasons to support its decision the High
Court is powerless,
Taking advantage of this rule, adninmistrative tribunals tend to give a bare decision in order to escape supervision." 38 It is indeed, difficult for an observer interested in strengthening judicial control not to agree with Professor I-Iamson that the
"distinction at present drawn between 'speaking' and 'unspeakiig
orders is a mere obstacle to the administration of justice the high
court should have the power either
to quash without more ado
an order which is 'unspeaking' or at least to compel the inferior
tribunal to make tip and transmit a full record. ' "
CERTIORARI

AND DECLARATION CO-NI'ARF.)

Under the "speaking order" doctrine, certiorari will issue only
if the challenged administrative decision "speaks" its error of law
If the order at issue is an "unspeaking" one, in that it does not give
any reasons, certiorari will not be available even though the decision may, in actuality, be based upon an erroneous conception of
law This result follows naturally from the principle that, on certiorari, the reviewing court's power of inquiry is limited to the face
of the record, it may not go behind the determination upon which
it is asked to pass judgment.
Does this basic restriction upon the reviewing court's right of
inquiry apply in other than certiorari cases ? Lord Justice Denning
has indicated that this question can be answered in the iegatzve, at
least insofar as actions for injunctions or declaratory judgments are
concerned. In an important 1952 case, lie declared that the "remedy
by declaration and injunction
can be as effective as, if not more
effective than, certiorari. It is, indeed, more effective, because it is
not subject to the limitation that the error must appear on the
38. Rule of Law 46 (1955) (a report prepared by a commnittee of tihe
Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society)
39. Hamson, Executive Discretion and Judicial Control 207 (1954)
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face of the record."4 If the learned judge were correct in this remark, it could mean a significant change in the English law of
judicial review. It is true that the injunction can rarely be used as a
remedy in Britain in the field of administrative law, but, under
Bernardv. NationalDock Labour Board, the action for a declaration can now be used as a substitute for certiorari as a method of
securing judicial review of many administrative determinatlons.
If, as Denning, L. J., implies, the court in a declaratory judgment
proceeding is not restricted, in its inquiry, to the face of the record,
that could mean the end of the "speaking order" doctrine, which
really makes sense only in a proceeding like certiorari where the
limitation to the face of the record strictly applies.
Desirable though this result would be, it unfortunately appears
to be precluded by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Healev v
Minister of Health.42 In that case, the Minister of Health had determined that plaintiff, a shoemaker employed in the shoemaker's
shop of a mental hospital, was not a mental health officer within the
meaning of the regulations providing for the grant of superannuation benefits to such officers. Plaintiff then brought an action against
the Minister for a declaration that he was a mental health officer
It should be noted that as pointed out by Morris, L. J., in the
Healey case,4i is was not suggested that any error of law was revealed on the face of the Minister's determination. Plaintiff, however, in seeking a declaratory judgement was, in effect, asking the
court not to limit itself to the bare record. He claimed that since,
as a matter of fact, patients at the hospital where he was employed
worked in the shoemaker's shop, under his direction (at least part
of the time) as occupational therapy forming part of their treatment.
he was, in reality, a mental health officer.
According to Parker, L. J., plaintiff's claim was, in actuality,
based upon the assertion that the court's power of inquiry in a
declaration proceeding was broader than that in an action for certiorari. "It is
. contended that once the Minister has determined
the matter the High Court has jurisdiction
to go behind the
determination and to hold that it was wrong in law even though no
error of law appeared on the face of the determination. In other
words, it is contended that the court's supervisory jurisdiction is
wide enough to enable it to declare a determination to be unlawful
in the sense of being wrong in law even though the matter was not
40. Lee v. Showmen's Guild, [1952] 2 Q. B. 329, 346 (C.A.)
41. [1953] 2 Q. B. 18 (C.A.).
42. [1955] 1 Q. B. 221 (C.A. 1954).
43. Id. at 231.
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one which could form any ground for moving for an order of cer-

tiorari."

44

The Court of Appeal, in disposing of Healey's case, did so on
the technical ground that plaintiff had not expressly asked the court
to declare that the Minister's determination was invalid. ''his avoided the necessity for the court to deal directly with the claim that the
scope of review in a declaratory-judgment action was broader than
that in a certiorari proceeding. The implications of their Lordships'
opinions are, however, clearly against the validity of this claim.
which was characterized by Lord Justice Parker as "at once a
novel and far-reaching contention-novel in that so far as I know
such a jurisdiction, if it exists, has never been invoked, and farreaching in that, if valid awards of arbitrators and decisions of
statutory tribunals, such as rent tribunals, would be open to review,
even though there was no error on the face of such awards or decisions." 5 It seems unlikely that the judge who characterized plaintiff's contention in this way would uphold it as valid if the questioii
were presented squarely to him. The Healey case thus appears to
support the view that the scope of review of administrative decisions
is not wider in an action for a declaration than on an application for
certiorari." The action for a declaration may be an appropriate
alternative method of impugning an agency order for patent error
of law 4 But if the challenged order does not "speak" its error of

law, the declaratory judgment will be no more effective than certiorari as a method of review
ERROR OF FACT

Under Rex v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribu nal,
already discussed, the reviewing court can. on an application for
certiorari quash an administrative decision, not only for lack of
jurisdiction in the strict sense, but also for errors of law whch
appear on the face of the record. The decision of the Court of
Appeal in the Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal cast
was a natural culmination in the development of a law of judicial
well known.
review based upon the doctrine of ultra vires. As i,,
the starting point of the English law of review was the concept of
lack of jurisdiction. Only if the administration acted outside th(
area of authority marked out for it by law would the courts set
aside its action. But the courts, both in Britain and in other l'nglighId. at 232.
45. r1955] 1 Q. B. at 232.
46. See de Smith, Note, 18 Modern L. Rev. 163, 165 (1955)
47 Id. at 164.
44.
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speaking countries came to see that judicial review linuted to the
bare question of jurisdiction was hardly sufficient to control administrative illegality. The historic function of review, according to
the United States Attorney General's Committee on Admimstrative
Procedure, is to serve "as a brake on excursion by the admmstrative body beyond its lawfully delegated authority and on the excessive assumption of power by the executive."'48 In the performance
of this function we may expect the courts to speak the final word on
interpretation of law. The notion of ultra vires, originally imported
into the field of administrative law for the particular case of lack of
jurisdiction in the narrow sense, could be extended to other cases,
notably that of error of law, for proper construction of the law is a
limit that the administrator must defer to and he exceeds his power
9
if he does not conform to the law.4
Administrative action based upon an error of law cannot be said
to be within the authority conferred. Mr. Justice Brandeis has,
indeed, gone so far as to assert that "The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some court decide
whether an erroneous rule of law was applied,"50 and the Committee on Ministers' Powers came to a similar conclusion. 1 But,
whether we place the extension upon a constitutional basis or not,
it seems clear that the scope of judicial review has expanded from
its original starting point of correction of bare jurisdictional errors.
Judicial control today, in the words of Denning, L. J., "extends not
only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within their junsdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law." '52 To put it another way, the notion of ultra vires, upon which the English law of
review is grounded, has been expanded from the primary conception
of lack of jurisdiction to embrace cases involving improper exercises of jurisdiction.53
What has been said shows clearly that the English reviewing
court, like those in other common-law countries, will quash ad48. Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative

Procedure 77-78 (1941).
49. Compare Hauriow, Precis de Droit Admmistratif 405 (12th ed.
1933).
50.

(1936).

St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 84

51. Report of the Committee on Minister's Power 108 (Cmd. 4060,

1932).
52. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1
M. B. at 347.
53. This is shown even more clearly perhaps by the cases allowing
certiorari where natural justice has been violated, since there is plainl no
lack of jurisdiction in them. See Griffith & Street, op. cit. supra note 7,at

213.
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ministrative action when the agency concerned has committed a
patent error of law Is the same result reached when the challenged decision is based upon an error of fact?
Here again, to be sure, one can argue that the administration
is guilty of a false application of law It ordinarily receives authoritv
to take certain action, but only on the existence of a given legal and
factual situation. If the required situation of fact does not rcalh
exist can it not be said that the administration has misapplied tlh
law just as truly as when it commits an error of pure law' "Must
not the authority charged with ensuring respect for legality hv
setting aside errors of law also necessarily inquire into the facts " '
asks a French jurist. "Does not a false appraisal of the facts lead
to an error of law' In separating the two, are we not unjustifiabhlv
nmtilating the role of the reviewing court "
However valid this argument may be, it must be recognized that
it is utterly inconsistent with the present English law of scope ot
review The English law ot review is grounded almost entirely
upon the distinction between "law" and "fact" with which we dealt
at the beginning of this paper. The reviewing court can, we have
seen, intervene where an administrative decision is grounded upon
an error of law But the same is not true as far as mistakes of fact
are concerned, the commonly stated view is that administrative
findings of fact should not be subject to any review This view was
well articulated in the conclusion of the Committee on A\inisters
Powers on the Subject. "While we are of the opinion," reads its
Report, "that there should be an absolute and universal right ol
appeal to the High Court on any point of law from the judicial
decision of a minister or a Ministerial tribunal, we are satisfied
that there should as a rule be no appeal to any court ot law oii
issues of fact." 5
The English law on review of errors of fact appears imuch narrower than that followed by courts in the United States. As pointed
out in an English treatise, "The United States courts will review
administrative findings [of fact] which are not supported bv substantial evidence, that is, by 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' "" The
kmerican scope of review, according to Professor Wade, "at first
sight contradicts our rule that the court cannot substitute its owu
conclusions on the facts for that of the administrative agency
54. Goldenberg, Le Conseil d'Etat: Juge du Fait 13 (1932)
55. Report 108, op. cit. supra note 51.
56. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 219.
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chosen by Parliament. The American rule at least permits a limited
re-examination of the facts."57 Some British lawyers, indeed, go
even further and regard the American doctrine of review as an unwarranted interference by the judiciary in the sphere of adimnstration. "To my mind," writes Dr. Evatt, "the most surprising feature
in the development of administrative law in the United States is
the persistence of the notion that the ordinary courts of law should
be permitted to review the findings of fact which have been remitted by the legislature to the decision of the administrator."5s
The present writer has, however, asserted that the American
theory of review is not as different from that which prevails in
Britain as one might at first believe59 and, in this view, he has been
seconded by Professor Wade. 0 The latter writes that the difference
between the American and the English scope of review is "of less
significance since an English court can fall back on the 'no evidence'
rule, i.e. that as a matter of law an inference from the facts does not
logically accord with and follow from them, as the late Lord du
'61
Parcq once put it."
This statement has been criticized by Professors Griffith and Street. "It is suggested with respect" say they,
"that this statement is wrong. In the case relied on by Professor
'Wade, Lord du Parcq ,as dealing with income-tax litigation where
statute expressly gives a right of appeal on points of 'law' It is a
well-recognized rule that a right of appeal includes the right to
appeal from findings not supported by the evidence. But English
law has here always maintained the distinction between 'excess of
jurisdiction' and 'appeal on a point of law' and there is no decided
case in England to the effect that a right to quash for excess of
jurisdiction extends to circumstances where the decision is against
the weight of the evidence." 62
The criticism of Professor \NVade just quoted appears based
upon a misreading of both American and English law It errs, in the
first place, in its assumption that the American courts will set aside
an administrative decision where it is against the weight of the
evidence. Under the American theory the reviewing court is not
concerned with the weight of the evidence, it has only to see if the
57 Wade, Forward to Schwartz, American Adnimstrative Law vi
(1950).
58.

Evatt, The Judges and the Teachers of Public Lan, 53 Harv. L.

Rev. 1145, 1162 (1940).

59. Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 57, at 115-16.
60. Report 108, op. cit. supranote 51.
61. Ibid, citing Bean v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd.. [19441
2 All E. R_ 279,284 (C.A.).
62. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 220.
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administrative finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence.08
"In such cases," as Mr. Chief Justice Hughes has pointed out, "the
judicial inquiry
goes no further than to ascertain whether there
is evidence to support the findings, and the question of the weight
of the evidence in determining issues of fact lies with the legislative agency acting within its statutory authority "04 To criticize
Professor Wade because there is no English case quashing where
an administrative decision is against the weight of the evidence is
unwarranted, even if there is no such English case, that does not
demonstrate the error of Professor Wade's view that the English
scope of review is not very different from the American one, since.
as just pointed out, the American courts themselves do not inquire
into the weight of the evidence.
In actuality, the English courts have not kept as complete a
hands-off policy from reviewing administrative findings of fact as is
often supposed. *\Ve have already seen how, in the English system.
the scope of review has come to include errors of law, the reviewing
court in Britain will clearly set aside an administrative decisioi
based upon a misconception of the law But, under the view of the
English courts, it is a question of law whether there was any evidence upon which another tribunal could have come to the conclusion at which it had in fact arrived.65
The English courts may thus acquire competence to review
whether the administrative finding of fact is without evidentiarv
support, the question of evidentiary support is seen to be one ot
law, for a finding without such support is arbitrary and ultra vires
As Lord du Parcq aptly expressed it, in the case cited by Professor
\Vade, "To come to a conclusion which there is no evidence to support is to make an error in law "66
To this, the critics cited will object that Lord du Parcq was
speaking in a case where the statute expressly gave an appeal on
points of law, his views there, it will be urged, are not relevant in
cases where no such statute exists. It is difficult for the present
writer to see the force of this view Under the income tax law, the
aggrieved taxpayer, it is true, is given a right of appeal to the courts
63. Of course, reviewing courts are concerned with the weight of the
evidence whenever the review is de novo, as it is in many American cases.
such as, for instance, in all the cases coming to a court from the Internal
Revenue Service. The statement in the text assumes that the review is in
accordance with the substantial evidence rule.
64. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 51
(1936).
65. Compare Stepney Borough Council v. Joffe, [1949] 1 K. B. 599, 604.
66. Bean v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd., [19441 2 All. E. R.
279, 283 (C.A.).
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against a decision of the General (or Special) Commissioners of
Income Tax on the ground that it was erroneous in point of law.
But is the scope of review here not similar to that which now prevails in applications for certiorari and actions for declarations? In
the latter cases, too, as shown by decisions already dealt with,G the

courts will quash challenged determinations on the ground that they
were erroneous in point of law. It is hard to understand why the
scope of review, so far as error of law is concerned, should be different in the statutory than in the non-statutory review proceeding
(except, perhaps, for the limitation already discussed to errors on
the face of the record where the non-statutory method is used) If
lack of any evidence is an error of law in the statutory proceeding,
it should constitute similar error (at least where the lack is apparent
on the face of the record) in cases involving control by certiorari
68
and declaration.
That the distinction clanned by the critics already cited between
"excess of jurisdiction" and "appeal on a point of law" does not
really exist, at least insofar as the point under discussion is concerned, is shown by the cases under the appeal provisions of the
English Housing Acts. Under those laws, an individual aggrieved
by a clearance or compulsory purchase order may apply to the High
Court for the quashing of such order. The High Court may quash
if satisfied that "the order is not within the powers of this Act or
that the interests of the applicant have been substantially prejudiced
by any requirement of the Act not having been complied with."
This statutory review provision seems but to incorporate the
"excess of jurisdiction" theory of review which governs on an application for certiorari, and, if the distinction referred to is correct,
it should not be possible for the courts in Housing Act cases to
review the question of evidentiary support the way they do in cases
like those arising under the Income Tax Acts, where there are appeals on points of law. Yet. under the Housing Act cases, too, the
question of evidentiary support is construed to be one of law, and the
High Court can quash when there is no evidence in support of a
challenged order. This is demonstrated by the very first case construing the review provisions of the Housing Act of 1930. According to Swift, J., there, under that Act "An application may be made
to this Court . only on the grounds there specified-namely, that
the order is not within the powers of the Act, or that some require67 Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, supra note

15, Healey v. Minister of Health, supra note 42.
68. But compare Rex v. Paddington Rent Tribunal. [1955] 3 All E. R_
391 (Q.B.D.).
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ment of the Act has not been complied with, or on the turther
ground that there was no evidence to support the order "" And, in a
later case, Croom-Johnson, J., assumed (though without deciding
it) "that it is open to this court to examine and see whether there
is evidence, or whether there was evidence before the Minister wheii
he made the order, upon this theory, as I understand it, that if there
was no evidence entitling the Minister to come to the conclnsion
that the houses were in the condition indicated in the section, therefore, the order made thereupon was not within the power, of the
Act."o
If lack of evidence can be gone into in these Housimg \ct ca~e,.
it is hard to see why it cannot he gone into as well in iion-tatutorv
review proceedings, which are based upon essentially the same "ex
cess of jurisdiction" theory In Healey 7, MoHinis.er of Halth."
where the Court of Appeal refused to issue a declaration that
plaintiff was a mental health officer and entitled to superannuation
benefits as such. plaintiff's counsel, in urging that relief should he
granted where the Minister of Health had wrongly decided plaintiff
was not a mental health officer, took as an instance a case "where
the Minister had made a palpable error Suppose. lie said. that a
man had served more than 10 years and had reached the age of 60
Under regulation 7 he would be entitled to a pension. But ;uppo e
the Minister determined that lie had no right to one \\ ould no
the courts interfere '' - Lord Justice Denning answers this qIe-,
tion with a categorical affirmative. "I think they would. There would
in that case be good reason for thinking that the M'inister had iniitaken or misused his powers and the court would on that ground
declare his determination to be invalid." ' In the example given.
the Minister appears to have committed a manifest error of fact
contrary to all the evidence, lie has decided that the hypothetical
applicant did not come within the factual requirements of regulation
7 In such a case. for the court to be utterly precluded from exaniiing the question of evidentiary support would be for it to count(nance a patent injustice. If that question cannot be explored at all
by the judge, the right to judicial review becomes but an eiptv
form. "It makes judicial review of administrative orders a hopeles,
69. In re Bowman, [19321 2 K. B. 621. 627 (emphasis added)
70. Re the London County Council (Riley Street, Chelsea, No. I ) Order
1938, [1945] 2 All E. R. 484, 489. See, similarly, In re Bainbridge 119391
I K. B. 500, 502.
71. [1955] 1 Q. B. 221, supra note 42.
72. Id. at 227
73. Id. at 227-28.
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It reduces the judicial process in such
formality for the litigant.
74
cases to a mere feint."
In the Healey case itself, the plaintiff was a shoemaker who had
been held by the Minister not to be a mental health officer. The
finding of the Minister may well have been wrong in the light
of all the evidence (though, it must be admitted, this is hardly
likely on the facts as they are reported) , but, at the very least, the
Minister's decision was a reasonable one and cannot be said to
have been supported by no evidence at all. Suppose, however, that
the plaintiff had been a practising psychiatrist employed in the
relevant mental hospital and the Minister had then, contrary to all
of the evidence, classified him, for purposes of superannuation, not
as a mental health officer, but in the same category as the shoemaker
In such a case, would there be any doubt that the courts would
interfere? Even Professors Griffith and Street concede that "the
absence of any evidence, though not in itself necessarily a separate
head of review, must be treated as a cogent factor in deciding
whether to quash for unreasonableness or improper purpose."Th
In the opinion of the present writer, it would be more accurate to
treat lack of evidence as a separate ground of review But whether
one does so or treats it (as Messrs. Griffith and Street do) as a
factor indicating unreasonableness or improper purpose, or (as
Denning, L. J., does) as showing mistake or misuse of powers," is
less important than the fact that, as can be seen from the above
discussion, the English courts do have the power to inquire into
the question of evidentiary support.
Enough has been said to substantiate the contention that the
judge in Britain, like his confrere in the United States, can examine
administrative findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by evidence. It would, however, be a mistake to assume from
this that the scope of review of findings of fact is exactly the same
in both the English and American systems of administrative law.-Though the basic theory of review is similar in both countries (i.e..
whether a finding is supported by evidence is a question of law). the
scope of review in practice is not as broad in Britain as it is in the
United States. Under the English test (the so-called "no evidence"
rule), the reviewing court looks only to see that there is some evidentiary basis for the administrative finding; there is no quantita74. Jackson, J., dissenting, in Securities and Exchange Commission Y.
Chenery Corp., 332 U. S.194, 210 (1947).
75. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 8, at 221.
76. Supra note 72.
77 Of course, the scope of review in America varies from court to
court and from agency to agency.
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tive examination of the supporting evidence. If a factual issue is
involved, the administrative finding can, as Charles, J., has stated,
be interfered with only if the agency concerned had no material on
which to base it.7 8 Only if there is no evidence in support of the
finding is the administrative determination not within the powers
conferred. To quote Croom-Johnson, J., in a postwar case where
it was alleged that there was no evidence on which the Minister
could find as he did, "I am not concerned with the question as to
whether upon the facts as set out in the documents, and in the evidence on the one side or the other, I should have come to the same
conclusion or not.
This court is engaged simply in looking to
see
whether there is evidence. ' 70 Nor is the court concerned with
the question of the substantiality of the evidence in support. In the
words of the learned judge, "very little evidence may justify a
finding,
of fact."80 The individual seeking review cannot prevail unless the court upholds his contention that there is no evidence to support the finding.
In the American system, the reviewing court can, to some extent, undertake a quantitative examination of the evidence in support of administrative findings of fact. Judicial review in the United
States is, to quote Professor Wade again, governed by the " 'substantial evidence' rule, viz. that the scope of judicial review over
administrative action is limited to questions of law and to whcther
or not the findings of fact underlying the admintstrative conclusion
are based upon substantial evidence."8s' Under this test, when is the
evidence in support of an administrative finding of fact substantial ?
As the present writer reads the American cases, they require the
reversal of an administrative determination when a challenged
finding of fact is not a reasonable one in the light of the evidence in
the whole record. Substantial evidence is hence such evidence as
might lead a reasonable man to make the finding at issue. The
evidence in support of a fact finding is substantial when from it an
inference of the existence of the fact may be drawn reasonably In
such a case, the reviewing court must uphold the finding, even if it
would have drawn a contrary inference from the evidence. "Choice
lies with the Board and its finding is supported by the evidence and
82
is conclusive where others might reasonably make the same choice."
78. In re Bainbridge, [1939] 1 K. B. 500, 502.
79. Re the London County Council (Riley Street, Chelsea, No. 1) Order
1938, [1945] 2 All E. R. 484, 489 (K.B.D.).
80. Ibid.
81. See Wade, supra note 57
82. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 274, 26 N. E. 2d
247,255 (1940).
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The substantial evidence rule which governs the American
scope of review tests the rationality of administrative findings of
fact, taking into account all the evidence on both sides. The meaning of substantial evidence is that declared by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in a leading case, i.e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."8'
The substantial evidence test is thus a test of the reasonableness,
not of the rightness, of administrative findings of fact.
Under the American approach just analyzed, the reviewing
court can inquire into the rational basis of challenged adminmistrative findings. The court will not reverse merely because the finding
is not the one which it would have made had it been the initial adjudicator; if the finding is a reasonable one, it must be upheld.
This is not very far from the scope of review asserted by Lord
Greene, M. R., in a 1946 decision of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council. 4 In that case, which involved assessments by the
Canadian Minister of National Revenue to income tax and excess
profits tax for certain years, the Minister's decision was attacked
on the ground that there was before him no evidence on which he,
as a reasonable man, could determine that the profits in question
were in excess of what was reasonable for the particular business.
According to Lord Greene, in a case like this, the reviewing court
is "always entitled to examine the facts which are shown by evidence to have been before the Minister when he made his determination. If those facts are in the opinion of the court insufficient in law
to support it, the determination cannot stand. In such a case, the
determination can only have been an arbitrary one. If, on the other
hand, there is in the facts shown to have been before the Minister
sufficient material to support his determination the Court is not at
liberty to overrule it merely because it would itself on those facts
have come to a different conclusion.""5
The approach articulated by Lord Greene in this passage is
analogous to that under the American rational basis test. What his
Lordship is saying is that the court can inquire into the reasonableness of the Ministerial determination. 8 If the evidence shows it to
83. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305
U. S. 197,229 (1938).
84. Minister of National Revenue v. Wrights' Canadian Ropes, Ltd.,
[1947] A. C. 109 (1946).
85. Id. at 123.
86. Compare the review of by-laws and decisions of local authorities,
where the courts in Britain can inquire into reasonableness. See Assocated
Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K. B. 223,
234.
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have been reasonable, even though not that which the court would
have made, it must be upheld, if found arbitrary, it will be overruled. \What is most significant about the case in which lord
Greene made these observations is the fact that it was not one iiivolving judicial review of an administrative decision based upon the
"excess of jurisdiction" theory The relevant statute provided for a
full appeal to the Canadian Exchequer Court, and the appeal wa.
to be regarded as an action in the court."' The case was thus
analogous to an appellate case in the judicial process. And it illtstrates the truth of a remark made on a previous occasion by the
present writer that, in general, judicial review of administrative
agencies in America has been assimilated to appeals from lower
courts.8 8 The scope of review of administrative findings permitted
under the American rational basis rule is basically similar to that
which prevails in Britain where appellate proceedings are concerned.
It is not contended that the broader scope of review allowed
tinder the American system should necessarily be imported into
English administrative law Two observations should, however lie
made. The first is that, as has already been emphasized, the Anierican rule is not as inconsistent with English law as is commonly
supposed. The courts in Britain already possess the power to inquire into the question of whether there is any evidence in support
of challenged administrative findings. To permit them to make a
quantitative analysis of the evidentiary support similar to that perinitted to American courts would involve a change of degree, and
not of kind. Secondly there is little doubt that the American scope
of review makes for far more effective judicial control of administrative action. In a 1949 case involving an appeal from a licensing
decision, Lord Goddard, C. J., stated, in reply to the contention that
all that the appellate tribunal could decide was whether there was
any evidence upon which the licensing authority could come to its
decision, "If that argument be right, the right of appeal
would
be purely illusory "" Although it may not be generally realized, the
same can well be said of the right of review, where inquiry into
the facts is limited by the "no evidence" rule. It is very rare for an
administrative agency to act without any evidence in support of itq
findings. But, unless it does so act, under the English law, its findings of fact are conclusive. And it should not he forgotten that it is
87

See [19471 -\.
C. at 122.

88.
89.

See Schwartz, op cit. supra note 57 at 109.
Stepney Borough Council v. loffe, [19491 1 K. B. 599, 602.
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the power to find the facts, rather than the law, that is the decisive
element in thevast majority of cases. As aptly stated by an American
Chief Justice, "The power of administrative bodies to make findings
is a power of enorof fact which may be treated as conclusive
might be tempted
administrator
An
unscrupulous
consequence.
mous
to say, 'Let me find the facts for the people of my country and I
care little who lays down the general principles' "9O
JURISDICTIONAL

FACTS

Under the scope of review which prevails in English administrative law, the reviewing court can intervene only to correct errors
of law. It is true, as we have seen, that the question of evidentiar °
support is construed as one of law, so that the court can examine
findings of fact to determine whether they are supported by evidence.
But the judicial inquiry into fact findings does not go further than
to determine whether there is any evidence to sustain them, only if
the administrative finding of fact is supported by no evidence in the
record can the English courts grant relief.
A different result will however, be reached if the fact at issue
is a jurisdictional one. "The courts can intervene if some fact which
is a condition precedent to the exercise of administrative power is
non-existent."9 1 To apply the normal theory of limited review of
facts would run counter to the policy of the law against allowing
inferior tribunals to determine the limits of their own jurisdiction.
"An [administrative] agency may not finally decide the limits of its
statutory power," the United States Supreme Court has declared.
"That is a judicial function. 92 WVhere the administrative jurisdiction depends upon a finding of fact, the reviewing court should be
able to determine for itself whether that finding is correct. "No
tribunal of inferior jurisdiction," as Farwell, L. J., expressed it,
"can by its own decision finally decide on the question of the existence or extent of such jurisdiction such question is always subject
and it is immaterial whether the
to review by the High Court
decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of the existence or
non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact, a
Court with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend
90. Hughes, C. J., quoted m Landis, op. cit. supra note 4,at 136.

91. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 208.
92. Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U. S. 358, 369 (1946). Tins
case, as such, may be considered inconsistent with other Supreme Court decisions, but the quoted statement has been referred to with approval in East
Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U. S. 49 (1956).
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such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the
'
ward of Chepe." 93
In the postwar English cases, the doctrine of full judicial review
of so-called jurisdictional facts has been applied most frequently
upon review of the determinations of the tribunals set tip under the
Furnished Houses (Rent Control) Act, 1946. Under that law
Lord Goddard, C. J., has stated, "Parliament has chosen to make
them [i.e. the rent tribunals] the absolute masters of the situation
and to leave the decision of these cases to them without appeal.""
Despite this, it has been clear that the Queen's Bench Division can
intervene by an order of certiorari when a rent tribunal acts in exce
of its jurisdiction, and, since the Northumberland CompCnsation
Appeal Tribunal case, 95 when it commits an error of law apparent
on the face of the record. It was this which recently led the Minister
of Housing, when asked in the I-louse of Commons to introduce a
law to enable the parties in rent tribunal proceedings to rcqire a
case on points of law to be stated to the High Court, to assert that
such a law was unnecessary, since, at the present time, "If a tribunal
exceeds its jurisdiction, or misdirects itself in law action can be
taken in the High Court to quash the decision."' 'v
As early as May, 1947, the Divisional Court quashed a rent
tribunal determination on the ground that the tribunal had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case, where it did not appear that the
landlord was contractually entitled to a payment for the use of
furniture or "services" provided by him at the rented prenuses. "
In the case referred to, it would seem that the jurisdiction of the
tribunal depended upon whether there was, in fact, a contract for the
provision of furniture or services by the landlord and the court
appears to have decided this factual question upon its own independent judgment. In a case decided in July, 1947, where the court
quashed the determination of a rent tribunal upon the same ground.
counsel for the landlords expressly urged the rule of full review ol
jurisdictional facts, asserting that "Since the existence and extent
of jurisdiction in the tribunal depends on the facts, the question iay
93. Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, [19101 2 K. B. 859, 880
(C.A.) See White and Collins v. Minister of Health, [19391 2 K. B. 838, for
a striking application of the doctrine of full review of jurisdictional facts.
94. Rex v. Paddington Rent Tribunal. [19471 1 All E. R. 448. 450
(K.B.D.) Compare Rex v. Paddington Rent Tribunal, [19551 3 All K. R. 391.
396 (Q.B.D.) where the Lord Chief Justice declared, "These tribunals, on
may say, are a law unto themselves."

95.

See note 15 rupra.

96. 535 H. C. Deb. 5s., cols. 234-35 (written answers)
97 Rex v. Hampstead and St. Pancras Rent Tribunal, [19471 K. It
973. See, similarly, Rex v. Paddington and St. Marvlebone Rent Tribunal.

[19471 K. B. 984.
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arise as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to find those facts..
[T] heir findings of fact can be investigated by this court. Therefore
unless this court can find evidence on which the tribunal could hold
that there is a term of the contract that the landlords should provide
hot water, they must be held to have acted without jurisdiction."O8
The court did not expressly adopt the doctrine urged, but its decision quashing the tribunal's determination was based upon the
tribunal's factual error in finding that a contract existed, which
certainly implies full review of the jurisdictional fact.
In two 1950 decisions,99 the Divisional Court made express its
reliance upon the jurisdictional fact doctrine in rent tribunal cases.
"I am of opinion," states Lord Goddard, C. J., in one of the decisions referred to, "that the tribunal in the present case had power
to inquire into.
. whether there was a contract, because it was
only if there was a contract that they could exercise the jurisdiction
which the Act of Parliament has given them. When they have decided that, it is open to the person who complains of that decision
to ask this court to inquire into it by means of certiorari."' 00 Nor is
the court's inquiry concluded by the tribunal's finding on the question of jurisdictional fact. "It must not merely appear that a contract exists on which they could exercise their jurisdiction it inust
si fact exist." 1 1
To an American observer, these English rent tribunal cases, all
decided since the last war, which apply the rule of full judicial review of jurisdictional facts, are of particular interest, for the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court during the same
period manifests a striking tendency completely to abandon the
jurisdictional fact doctrine. Until recently, it is true, the American
tribunal was as firmly wedded to that doctrine as the English courts
appear to be. In Crowell v. Benson, 02 however, the leading American decision articulating the rule of full review of jurisdictional
facts, Mr. Justice Brandeis announced a famous dissent in which
he challenged the very basis of the jurisdictional fact doctrine.
According to him, most statutory schemes of the type administered
by regulatory or social service agencies imply a large number of
facts on which jurisdiction turns, and full judicial review over them
could practically do away with the limitations imposed by the courts
98. Rex v. Croydon and District Rent Tribunal, [1948] 1 K. B. 60, 62
(1947).
99. Rex v. London, etc., Rent Tribunal, [1951] 1 K.B. 641 (1950) , Rex
v. Fulham, etc., Rent Tribumal, [1950] 2 All E. R. 211 (K.B.D.).
100. Rex v. London, etc., Rent Tribunal, [1951] 1 C B. 641, 646 (1950).
101. Id. at 647 (emphasis added), see Parker, J.
102. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
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upon their review power over factual issues. In Justice Bra(dets'
view, it would be both burdensome to reviewing courts and disruptive of administrative processes to hold that every fact Issue oil
which a claim of lack of statutory jurisdiction can be made to depend becomes thereby entitled to a full redetermination by the courts
on review The reason is that there are few factual questions of any
importance that, if incorrectly decided by the administration, cannot
be made the basis of a claim of lack of statutory jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court itself soon became convinced
of the logic of Justice Brandeis' dissent. And this led the Court to
all but abandon the jurisdictional fact doctrine in its recent jurisprudence, findings of fact on which jurisdiction depends are reviewed no more broadly than ordinary findings of fact.io° ' The Fnglish rent tribunal cases, on the other hand, indicate that the courts
in Britain still assert the power to inquire into the facts on which
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal depends.104 The unportance of judicial control on the question of jurisdiction has been
seen to outweigh the inconveniences to administration that might
result from employment of the jurisdictional fact doctrine.
A caveat should perhaps be interposed here. Though the rent
tribunal cages qhow the adherence of the English courts to the rule
of full review of facts upon which jurisdiction depends. it would le
going too far to say that they will inexorably apply that rule in all
cases. On the contrary, in cases where the problem of jurisdictional
fact has arisen, the English courts have consistently followed the
distinction drawn by Lord Esher, M. R.. in what has been termed the
0
"classic judgment" on the subject."'
According to hi, Lordship.
"When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise
the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament.
the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal
or body It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists
and is shewn to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not
otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether
that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will b(
103. See Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common-Law
World 237-38 (1954)
104. Compare Rex v. Paddington Rent Tribunal, [19551 3 All E. R.
391 (Q.B.D.), where the court seemed to distinguish between the three jurisdictional facts expressly contained in section 40 (1) of the Housing Repairs
and Rents Act, 1954, and other facts upon which, it was claimed, jurisdiction
depended.
105. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209.
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held that they acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state
of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal
or body with a jurisdiction, wuch includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the
jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do
something more."' 10 6
In the second type of case, Lord Esher concludes, it iberroneous
to apply the doctrine of full review of jurisdictional facts. A tribunal of the second type can give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist "because the legislature gave them
jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the
preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction
depends."'' 10
As the cases already discussed demonstrate, the English rent
tribunals are tribunals of the first type referred to by Lord Esher.
"As a result, it must not merely appear to these tribunals that the
condition precedent to their jurisdiction exists, but it must in fact
exist."los In Rex v. Ludlow; ex parte Barsley Corporation.D on
the other hand, it was held that a tribunal of the second type mentioned by Lord Esher was involved. In that case, the corporation
had been ordered by a deputy umpire to reinstate a former employee
under the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1944. The corporation applied for certiorari to quash the reinstatement order on
the ground that it was made without jurisdiction, since the person
ordered reinstated was not its "employee." Lord Goddard, C. I., in
delivering judgment, indicated clearly that the doctrine of full
review of jurisdictional facts would not be applied. After quoting
the passage of Lord Esher given above, lie stated that "Parliament
may entrust the tribunal with the power of deciding whether or not
they have jurisdiction, because they are empowered to decide the
preliminary facts which alone will give it to them. It seems to me
that that is what the tribunal has done in the present cas.e, and that
it was clearly given the right to do so by . the Act. ' "" The deputy
umpire was, in other words, clothed by the Act with jurisdiction to
decide his own jurisdiction.
Why should the jurisdictional fact doctrine be applied in the
rent tribunal cases, but not in that involving the reinstatement tri106. The Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purpose; (if the Income

Tax, 21 Q. B. D. 313, 319 (1888).
107. Id. at 320.
108. Rex v. London, etc., Rent Tribunal, [1951] 1 t. B. 641. 647
(1950).

109. [1947] K. B. 634.
110. Id. at 640.
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bunal? It is difficult to see any real distinction between tile two
types of cases. The administrative authority to act was as nuch idcpendent upon the existence of the employment relationship in the
Barnsley Corporation case as was that of the rent tribunals upon
the existence of a contract for furniture or services in the cases already discussed. It is true, as Lord Esher says, that Parliament can
enact that administrative findings shall be conclusive on question,
of jurisdictional fact (and even on pure matters of law, for that
matter) But Parliament has not expressly (lone so in these cases
and one searches in vain for an indication of implied legislative
intent which was present in Barnsley Corporation but not in the
rent tribunal cases. It may be that the only explanation one can give
for the difference in result is that stated by Professors Griffith and
Street. "Despite the seeming clarity and certainty of Lord Esher's
test, in practice Parliament has so conspicuously failed to give the
courts assistance that they are bound to make a creative choice and
it would hardly be surprising if they declared a fact 'jurisdictional'
when thev had already decided that they would like to interfere with
tle administrative tribunal.'. In this view, the rent tribunal cases
are explainable primarily on the basis of the judicial hostility to a
new type of tribunal, dispensing informal administrative Justice
in an area which had heretofore been more or less the exclusive
domain ot the common law whose decisions are rendered ininititie
from any appeal.
The present writer does not deny the existence of the julicial
tendency relied on by the authors just cited, to increase the scope
of judicial review when they have less confidence in the particular
tribunal. '-' \t the same time, it is felt that that tendency i,not
enough to explain the difference in result as between Barnslhv Cor
poration and the rent tribunal cases, so far as review of jurisdictional
facts is concerned. In actuality the distinction drawn by I.ord
Esher is as has been indicated, not workable in practice becau,,e
the parliamentary intent with regard to review of jurisdiction is
rarely if ever, clearly manifested. And. if that is true it mean, that
the basis relied on by Lord Goddard for his Barnslev Corporalton
decision was really non-existent. This means, in turn. that tlhe
judicial approach in Barnsh'y Corporation is inconsistent with that
followed in the rent tribunal cases, for there was as much reason f)r
applying the doctrine of full review of jurisdictional facts it Barns1e, Corporationas in the other cases. Ifthis conclusion is sound. the
implications are disturbing. The unexplained refusal of the court in
111. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209-10.
112. Id.at224.

1956]

ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE REI*IEII"

the Barnsley Corporationcase to apply the jurisdictional fact doctrine leaves the commentator on English administrative law m, to
say the least, a somewhat bewildered state. The life of the law may
not be logic, but a branch of the law that is not logically consistent
internally leaves much to be desired. Whatever one may thing of
the merits of the doctrine of full review of jurisdictional facts, its
application should be a consistent one. If, on the contrary, the
doctrine is sometimes applied and sometimes not, in cases that appear to be fundamentally alike, then the law on the subject is far
from satisfactory. The evil resulting from judicial inconsistency in
applying a supposedly established doctrine is self-evident. If the
application of such doctrine in particular cases depends primarily
upon judicial fancy, the law becomes, not a chart to govern conduct,
but a game of chance, instead of settling rights and liabilities, it
unsettles them."13
MIxED QuEsTIo Ns

Our discussion thus far has been based on the assumption that
there is a clear-cut distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, with the former for the reviewing court and the latter
primarily for the administrator. Actually, as administrative lawyers
on both sides of the Atlantic have come to realize, the distinction
between "law" and "fact," on which the scope of review is based,
is not nearly so well defined as is often supposed. "[AIs Sir Cecil
Carr has pointed out, the distinction between law and fact is easier
to express in a phrase than to preserve consistently in practice, and,
indeed, this is a difficulty which constantly arises in all branches
of the law."" The extent of review depends upon which side of the
law-fact dividing line the challenged administrative finding is seen
to fall. Yet there may be great difficulty in concrete cases in determining on which side of the line a particular finding does fall. The
law-fact distinction, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has asserted, "is often
1
not an illuminating test and is never self-executing."' "
The difficulty involved in applying the distinction between "law"
and "fact" in particular cases has led to the characterization of a
large number of questions as "mixed questions of law and fact." In
Anglo-American administrative law, the problem of the so-called
mixed questions has arisen most frequently in recent years in
connection with the application of statutory language to particular
113.
321 U. S.
114.
115.

Compare Roberts, J., dissenting, in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co.,
96, 112 (1944).
Allen, op. cit. supro note 1,at 160.
Baumgartner v.United States, 322 U. S. 665, 671 (1944)
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states of fact. The extent to which the courts review the application
of legal terms or concepts to the facts is, indeed, now the heart of
the problem of scope of review "' "The difficulty is," as an English
treatise points out, "most acute when statutes include words of
variable meaning, for example 'producer' or 'employee.' If a statute
gives a right of appeal on law and a party wishes to challenge the
administrative holding that he is a 'producer,' is that an appealable
'
point of law ? 117
In the American system, the answer must be a negative one The
leading case is Gray v. Powell, 11 a 1941 decision of the Federal
Supreme Court. The administrative finding at issue there was similar to that mentioned in the just-cited quotation. namely that the
party seeking review was not a "producer." The statute involved
was one fixing coal prices, though exempting from its regulatory
provisions coal consumed by a "producer " The private party concerned claimed that the coal consumed by it came within this exemption and challenged the administrative finding that he wa not
a "producer " In upholding the agency concerned, the '\merican
Court indicated that the finding at issue was primarily within the
administrative competence and not subject to wider review than
agency findings of pure fact. "'\Vhere, as here, a determination has
been left to an administrative body," the Court's opinion reads.
"this delegation will be respected and the administrative concluson
Mthough we have here no dispute a to the
left untouched.
does not permit a court to substitute mtV
that
facts,
evidentiary
judgment for that of the Director"I"
In Gray 7, PowLell, it was at least arguable that the challenged
administrative finding was not right. But the American ('ourt expressly states that that is not its concern upon review The reviewim court can reverse only when it "can say that a et of cir
cunmstances deemed by the Commission to bring then within the
concept 'producer' is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted bw ( ongress to the Commission as in effect to deny a sensible exercise of
iudgment."' 20 In such a case, it would seem that the administrative
finding is not only not right but also not reasonable Where, oii the
contrary the agency determination, though perhaps erroneous in
the view of the reviewing court, is a reasonable one. "it is the
116. Davis, Administrative Law 868 (1951)

117 Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 224.
118. 314 U. S. 402 (1941) But see Davis, Administrative Law 247

(1951).
119. 314 U. S. at 412.
120. Id. at 413.
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Court's duty to leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed."''
It may be going too far to assert, as did Mr. Justice Roberts who
dissented, that the majority of the Court adopted its construction
of the term "producer" "apparently only because the Director has
adopted it,"'122 but it is certainly true that, under the Court's reasonmg, it could not substitute its judgment for that of the Director on
the proper construction of the statutory term. Even if the Court
would have construed the term differently had the matter been before it originally for decision upon its own independent judgment,
it had to accept the agency construction, provided only that it did
not pass the bounds of reason.
Gray v. Powell lays down the doctrine that, on review, an administrative construction of a statutory term like "producer" will be
upheld if it is rational, even though the court might well have construed the term differently on its own independent judgment. As

it was explained by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson in a later case applying the Gray v. Powell doctrine, "To sustain the Commission's
application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we
would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in
judicial proceedings. The 'reviewing court's function is limited.'
All that is needed to support the Commission's interpretation is that
it has 'warrant in the record' and a 'reasonable basis in law' "'12
Gray v. Powell thus stands for the proposition that the test upon
review is not the rightness of the challenged administrative finding
upon the question of whether the individual concerned was a "producer," but only its reasonableness. But, we have already seen, the
question of reasonableness is also that which the American courts
must now ask themselves in reviewing administrative findings of
fact. Gray v. Powell is so important to American administrative
law precisely because it makes the scope of review of administrative
findings like that involved in it similar to that available over administrative findings of fact. In both cases, the reviewing court can
determine only whether the challenged findings possess a rational

basis.
In Gray v. Powell and the many cases in accord with its doctnne,2 4 the American courts appear, in effect, to have done exactly what Lord Atldnson strongly protested against in an important
121. Ibid.
122. Id. at 422.
123. Unemployment Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143,
153-54 (1946).
124. See Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the Scope of Re iew, 54 Mich.
L. Rev. 1 (1955), for a complete discussion.
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case. "What I have many times in this House protested against,"
said his Lordship. "is the attempt to secure for a finding on a
mixed question of law and fact the unassailability which belongs only
to a finding on questions of pure fact. This is sought to be effected
by styling the finding on a mixed question of law and fact a finding
of fact. ' 1" 2 5 In the view commonly followed by the English courts a
finding such as that at issue in Gray v Powell, involving as it did
the application of the statutory term "producer" to the undisputed
facts of the case, is one which is more legal than factual in nature
and hence one which can be examined fully by the reviewing court.
This view was well expressed over forty years ago by Lord Parker
when he stated, "in my humble judgment where all the material
facts are fully found, and the only question is whether the facts are
such as to bring the case within the provisions
of some statutory
enactment, the question is one of law only ",I21
A number of English cases decided during the post-war decade
adhere to Lord Parker's view Among the most interesting of them
is a 1951 judgment of Ormerod, I., in a case arising under the
National Insurance Act, 1946. The appellant there was a music
hall artist who had entered into a contract tinder which he tindertook to appear in a variety act at a theatre for one week. The
Minister of National Insurance had held that during that week
appellant was not an "employed person," but was a "self-employed
person" within the meaning of the relevant sections of the Act.
Counsel for the employer contended that, as appellant's right to
appeal was restricted to an appeal on matters of law, the appeal
had to be dismissed if it could be said that there was evidence by
which the Minister could find that the contract was one for services
only, rather than one of service. In other words. the contentioi
asserted was that the question whether appellant was an "employed
person" was one of fact, which the court could examine only to see
if it was supported by any evidence. Ormerod, J., refused to accept
this argument, stating instead that the question was one of law
and therefore one which could be the subject of an appeal tinder the
statute. This was so. said he, because the case depended upon the
127
construction of the written employment contract.
It may be said that this decision is so obvious as hardly to le
worth discussing, since, as Lord Atkin has pointed out, the construction of a written agreement is manifestly a pure question of
125. Great Western Rv Co. v. Bater. [19221 2 A. C. 1. 12.
126. Farmer v. Cotton's Trustees, [19151 \. C 922. 932.
127 Gould v. Miniter of National Insurance. [19511 I All R. R. 368
372 (K.B.D.)
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law 1211It should, however, be borne in mind that, under Gray v.
Powell and the American cases following its doctrine, the scope
of review will not be broadened by the fact that the answer to the
mixed question of law and fact depends upon the construction of a
contract or some other legal document. Indeed, as we shall emphasize, the whole point about Gray v. Powell is that it narrows
the scope of review of administrative interpretations of legal documents. It may be, to quote Mr. Justice Frankfurter on the effect of
the American rule, that "the construction of documents has for
historic reasons been deemed to be a question of law in the sense
that the meaning is to be given by judges and not by laymen. But
this crude division between what is 'law' and what is 'fact' is not
relevant to the proper demarcation of functions as between [administrative agencies] and the revieimg courts.
The specialized
equipment of the [agency] and the trained instinct that comes from
its experience ought to leave with the [agency] the final say also
"12V
as to matters which involve construction of legal documents.
Other English decisions which illustrate the difference between
the judicial approach on both sides of the Atlantic to review of the
type of finding under discussion are those involving war pension
claims. The key question in many of these cases isthat of whether
the disability for which the claimant seeks redress was attributable
to war service. "Was the question of attributability a question of
law or a question of fact ?" counsel for a pension claimant was asked
from the Bench in one case. 30 "It .vas a mixed question of law
and fact," was his reply.' 3' As in the cases we have been discussing,
the administrative finding on the mixed question involves the application of a legislative term"3 -- here, "attributable to military service during the war"-to the facts of the particular case. Under the
American cases, such agency finding will be treated like a finding
of fact for the purpose of determining the proper scope of review.
The English war pension cases, on the contrary, treat it as a finding
of law which is fully reviewable.33 A similar result is reached where
128. Binding v. Great Yarmouth Port and Haven Comrs., 92 L. I. K. B.
377,381 (C.A. 1923).
129. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner. 325 U. S. 365, 380-81 (1945).
130. Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, [1949] 1 K. B. 7,228 (1948).
131. Ibid.
132. In this case, it should be noted, the legislative instrument was the
Royal Warrant of June 29, 1940 (I).
133. It is recognized, as Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7,at 221,
n. 2, points out, that, m these war pension cases, the Royal Warrant provides
that disablement should be accepted as due to war service unless there is
evidence to the contrary. But this does not seem to affect the question under
discussion, namely, whether the adnumstrative finding should be treated as
one of law or fact for the purpose of determining the scope of review.
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the administrative finding at issue determines whether an injury
was "caused by" a bomb dropped by the enemy"' or whether the
claimant had suffered a "disablement,"' 35 or whether the injury
suffered arose "out of and in the course ol the performance by
[claimant] of his duties as a member of the civil defence orgaisation."'u36 These English cases should be compared with an uportant 1951 decision of the United States Supreme Court in wlucli
an administrative finding that a death for which compensation was
sought had arisen "out of and in the course ot employnent" (a. wa,
required by the relevant statutes) was treated as a quetioin of
"fact" and hence subject only to limited review I
To the comparative observer, the difference in approach as bctween the American and English courts to review of administrative
findings applying statutory concepts to the facts is a matter of
great significance and, in this aspect of the subject at least, the difference is not one which casts credit upon the American system
The type of finding under discussion is. in many ways, the most
important which the administrator can make in exercising adjudicatory authority For it is by its application of the statutory language to particular fact patterns that the agency concerned give,
specific form and content to its enabling legislation. Where an
agency misapplies the statute upon which its power rests, it may
well be acting beyond its authority Proper administration of ain
statutory scheme presupposes proper application of the terms and
concepts employed in the relevant legislation. Misapplication of a
key statutory term may well enable the adlministrator to act in
excess of his jurisdiction. If a rent tribunal is vested with authority
to lower rents in cases where the landlord has contracted to provide turniture or services, its very power to act depends upon it,
finding that a given chattel is "furniture." ' ," Indeed, it is diflicult
not to conclude that the statutory jurisdiction of an administrative
agency is always dependent upon the proper application of the
terms and concepts contained in its enabling legislation. o' linmit
review of such application by the agency is, i1 effect, to linit review
on the jurisdictional question. Yet this is precisely what is done uider the American case of Gray v Powell.
134. Minister of Pensions v. Chennell, [19471 K. B. 250 (1946)
135. Harris v. Minister of Pensions, [19481 1 All E. R. 191 (K..1).

136. Davis v. Minister of Pensions, [19511 2 All E. R. 318 (K.B.D})
137 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504 (1951)
Compare James Patrick & Co., Ltd. v. Sharpe, [1954] 3 All E. R. 216, 217-18
(P.C.), where a similar question is treated by the judicial Commttee of tile
Privy Council as one of law.

138. See Rex v. Blackpool Rent Tribunal, [19481 2 K. B. 277
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It is a patent misuse of terms to say that an administrative finding that a death "arose out of and in the course of employment" is
a finding of "fact," as did the United States Supreme Court in a
case already referred to. 139 It is actually, as Viscount Cave, L.C.
once urged, "a mixed finding of fact and law, and unless such a
finding is open to review by the Courts little benefit will accrue to
the subject from the right which is given to him to have a case
stated for the opinion of the King's Bench Division."140 Though the
administrative finding in this type of case may well be, in large part,
one of fact, i.e., whether the death did arise out of and in the course
of employment depends upon the factual circumstances under which
the death occurred, it also involves a question of statutory interpre-

tation. To apply the statutory term "out of and in the course of
employment" to the facts of specific cases is to give concrete meaning to that term.
It is recognized that it may be denied that a finding of the type
under discussion is one of statutory interpretation in the strict sense.
It has been urged by American jurists that the interpretation and
application of statutes are two different things. In this view, interpretation properly so called includes only the determination of the
proper sensible meaning of the statute. Application is the process
of determining whether the facts of the particular case are within
or without that meaning.'-' Under this view, it will be said, findings
of the type we are concerned with involve only the application, not
the interpretation, of the relevant statute.
In the opinion of the present writer, to so differentiate interpretation from application is to make a mere dialectic distinction. A
statutory term can have meaning only in its application to the
particular facts of a particular case. 42 As Mr. justice Frankfurter
has aptly pointed out, "Meaning derives vitality from application.
'
Meaning is easily thwarted or distorted by misapplication.'

Actually, the steps in the process of interpreting statutes may be
divided into three parts (1) finding or choosing the proper statute
or statutes applicable, (2) interpreting the statute law in its technical sense; (3) applying the meaning so found to the case at
14 4
hand.
139. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U. S. 504 (1951).

140. Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Lysaght, [1928] A. C. 234, 241.

141. DeSloovere, Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes, 10 N. Y.

U. L. Q. Rev. 1, 17 (1932).

142. National Labor Relations Board v. American Ins. Co., 343 U. S.
395,410 (1952).
143. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 380 (1945).
144. De Sloovere, supra note 141, at 1.
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To find out the meaning of a statutory term only in the abstract
is to engage in vacuous academic exercise. It is when the meaning
so found is applied to the case at hand that the statute is really being
interpreted. Indeed, as one authority well puts it, the final application to a specific case is the crux of the whole process of statutory

interpretation.

145

That application really is the critical stage ot the interpretive
process is clear upon consideration of Austin's famous distinction
between what he called "genuine" and "suprious" interpretation.
The latter type, said he, involves the application of a statutory provision to a case which does not upon a proper interpretation conic
within the statute. "The judge applies the law to the fact, according
to his opinion of the meaning or (by a process which is generally
confounded with interpretation or construction, but which in truth
is legislation) he decides according to his own notion of what the
legislator ought to have established. By this extensive or restrictive
interpretation ex rationelegzs, much judiciary law grows tip."""
What Austin was declaiming against here was judicial misapplication of statutory terms. Can it be doubted that, in cases of the
kind referred to by him, application of law to fact was, not only
part of interpretation of the statute, but, in many ways, its most
significant part?
If an administrative agency finds that an individual is an cmiiployee of some other individual so as to make the regulatory law
admlinistered by it applicable to him, the agency appears clearly
to be interpreting the statutory term "employee." Calling the
agency's act mere application and not interpretation cannot change
the fact that its action is giving specific meaning to the legislative
language. As Lord Radcliffe recently expressed it, with regard to,
a similar problem, "fi]t is a question of law what meaning is to be
given to the words of the Income Tax Act 'trade, manufacture
adventure or concern in the nature of trade' and for that matter
what constitute 'profits or gains' arising from it. Here we have a
statutory phrase involving a charge of tax, and it is for the court,
to interpret its meaning
Y'147 And, if questions of statutory interpretation are to be determined by the reviewing court upon its own
independent judgment, it is difficult to see how it can logically limit
its review over findings claimed to misapply statutory terms. "It
the appellate courts must make an independent examination of the
145.
146.

Id. at 20.

Id. at 19, quoting 2 Austin, Jurisprudence 656 (4th ed. 1873)

Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum. L. Rev. 379 (1907)
147

Edwards v. Bairstow, [1955] 3 Weekly L. R. 410, 420 ( II.L.)

St-t.
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meaning of every word in
legislation, on the assumption that the
construction of legislative language is necessarily for the appellate
courts, how can they reasonably refuse to consider claims that the
words have been misapplied in the circumstances of a particular
case? 148
The decision of the American Court in Gray v. Powell assinilates review of questions of statutory interpretation to review of
questions of fact. That is a plain statement of its effect, no matter
how courts or commentators may try to obscure its meaning. And
it is because of its effect that Gray v. Powell is of such great consequence. It blurs the distinction between law and fact upon which
the scope of review in American, as in English, administrative law
had been grounded. It limits review, not only of agency findings of
"fact" in the narrow, literal sense, 49 but also of agency constructions of statute law. The latter are matters which, under the traditional theory of Anglo-American judicial review, are matters more
legal than factual in nature s0 and hence for the courts upon review.
By conveniently labelling them matters of application, rather than
interpretation, the American courts have continued to pay lipservice to the form of the traditional theory But the doctrine of
Gray v. Powell tends to make the practical effectiveness of that
theory a thing of the past in American administrative law
"IF THE MINISTER Is SATISFIED"

In our discussion of error of fact, we saw that the courts in
Britain, no less than their counterparts m the United States, can
inquire into the evidentiary basis of administrative findings. In the
English system, such judicial inquiry determines whether there is
any evidence in support of a challenged finding" for the administrator to make a finding or reach a conclusion which is supported by no
evidence is for him to make an error in law.25 ' It should, however,
be noted that, in a country whose public law is governed by the
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, even this degree of judicial
control can be precluded by appropriate legislative enactment. Thus,
in Robinson v. Minister of Town. and Country Planning,' " where
a ministerial order declaring certain land in Plymouth to be subject
to compulsory purchase was challenged on the ground that, at the
148. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U. S. 365, 380 (1945), per
Frankfurter, J.
149. The term used m Securities and Exchange Commission v. CentralIllinois Corp., 338 U. S. 96, 126 (1949).
150. The expression used in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.. 330

U. S. 469, 478 (1947).

151. See note 65 supra.
152. [1947] K. B. 702 (C.A.).
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time he made the order, the Minister had no evidence before him
to support it, Somervell, L. J., declared, "I think the Act gives the
Minister the power to come to his decision as an administrative
decision, which no doubt he can be called upon to justify in Parliament, but which he cannot be called on to justify in a court of law
on the ground that there was either insufficient evidence or no
evidence on which a reasonable man in the position of the Minister
could so decide."' ' i
What was the statutory provision which, according to the
learned judge, had the effect of barring judicial inquiry into the
question of evidentiary support? The Town and Country Planning
Act, 1944,1'4 provides that a declaratory order, such as that at
issue in the Robinson case, may be made where the Minister "is
satisfied" that it is requisite for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily
with extensive war damage in the area of a local planning authority In the now famous case of Liversidge v. Anderson,'" where it
was held that the language of Defence Regulation 18B had the
effect of precluding all judicial inquiry into a ministerial order,
even Lord Atkin, who vigorously dissented from this holding,
agreed that a provision like that in the 1944 Act just cited vested
in the Minister a complete discretion, free from control by the
courts. Citing defence regulations which contained expressions like
"If the Secretary of State is satisfied" or "satisfied
that
it is necessary," his Lordship said, "In all these cases it is plaii

that unlimited discretion is given to the Secretary of State, assuming as everyone does that he acts in good faith."1io If the defence
regulation at issue in the Liversidge case had contained such words.
it is clear, as Somervell, L. J., points out, that Lord Atkin would
have agreed with the majority there.157
The effect of a statutory provision like that in the Town and
Country Planning Act, 1944, under which the Minister can act if
he "is satisfied" his action is necessary, has been stated in argument by Sir Hartley Shawcross. Under the decided cases, said lie
it has been held that, where a Minister acted under such legislation.
"if the Minister was satisfied, the matter was a subjective one for
him and that, unless it could be shown that he acted in bad faith.
his decision stood."' 5 ' It must be conceded that there is support in
153. Id. at 720.
154. Section 1 (1).
155. [1942] A. C. 206 (1941).
156. Id. at 233.
157 [1947] K. B.at 721.
158. Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, [1948] A. C.
87, 95 (1947)
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the cases for Sir Hartley's view. The leading decision is the already
cited case of Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning.159 There, the objectors to the Ministerial order claimed that
there was no evidence upon which the Minister could decide as he
did. Even if true, however, that was irrelevant in view of the
statutory provision for Ministerial satisfaction. The conclusion that
the order should be made is, according to Lord Greene, M.R., "one
of opinion and policy as to which the Minister, assuming always that
he acts bona fide, is the sole judge; namely, he must be satisfied
that it is requisite for the purpose of dealing satisfactorily with
extensive war damage that all or some part of the land in question
should be laid out afresh and developed as a whole. The words
'requisite' and 'satisfactorily' clearly indicate that the question is
one of opinion and policy, matters which are peculiarly for the
Minister. . to decide. No objective test is possible."' 0 0 The argument of the objectors could not succeed in the face of the clear
legislative intent that it was the satisfaction of the Minister, not
that of the court, that was to prevail. "It imports an objective test
into a matter to which such a test is entirely inappropriate . and
this is to substitute a test formulated, in some unexplained manner
and according to some unascertainable principle, by the court itself
for the opinion of the Minister to which the language of the sub10
section commits the decision." '
The language of the judgments delivered in Robinson's case
certainly appears all but to bar judicial inquiry into a ministerial
order based upon a statutory provision like that contained in the
enabling act there. It is true that there is an implied condition, even
under such a statute, that the Minister act in good faith. "There may
be cases in which, on the ground of want of bona fides, a court may
have power to act."' 8 - But if the Minister does act in good faith,
and who could dispute it or disputing it prove the opposite,"' he
has been vested with complete discretion whether or not to issue
the order. As Croom-Johnson, J., expressed it in a decision rendered after the Robinson case, "the court will not go behind the
expression of the Minister's satisfaction."'"' In these cases, where
159. See note 152 supra.

160. [1947] K. B. at 713.
161. Id. at 714.
162. In re An Application by Beck and Pollitzer, [1948] 2 K. B. 339.
345.

163. Compare Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A. C. 206, 226 (1941).

164. In re An Application by Beck and Pollitzer. [1948] 2 K. B. 339,

345. See also Land Realisation Co. v. Post Office, [19501 1 All E. IL 1062.
1067 (Ch. D.), Taylor v. Brighton Borough Council, [1947] K. B. 736, 742.
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a Minister is, for example, authorized to issue an order if he is
satisfied that it is expedient in the national interest, "the ultimate
judge of what is or is not in the national interest is the Minister
It is not the local authorities. It is not the court."'810
Professor Hamson has recently informed us of the shock experienced by a noted French administrative lawyer to whom the
cases just discussed had been explained. "Touching provisions
based upon the condition 'If the Minister is satisfied' or 'If it appears to the Minister,' my French interlocutor was frankly scandalised
by the interpretation put upon them by the English
courts. He held the categorical, and refreshing, view (which is
that of the Conseil d'Etat) that if a Minister is to be satisfied, lie
must as Minister have reasonable grounds upon which his satisfaction is based.
He regarded as fantastic the suggestion that
a court would hold that the condition that a Minister should be
satisfied is finally fulfilled by the bare statement of M. Dupont (who
may happen to be Minister) declaring that M. Dupont is, or believes
himself to be, satisfied."' 66
The reaction of the French jurist was, in Professor Hainson's
phrase, to an English lawyer a most painful commentary upon the
state of this branch of the law in England.18 7 To one who has some
familiarity with the droit adrnumstratif, the French response is
hardly surprising. Though provisions like that involved in the
Robinson case are common enough in the French statute book, they
have not, for many years, been construed as they are in the English system. On the contrary, in the jurisprudence of the Conseil
d'Etat, as Professor Hamson indicates, though the statute provides
for a Minister being satisfied on a particular issue, his satisfaction
must be a reasonable one. And it is for the reviewing court (in
France the Conseil itself) to determine whether there are, in fact,
reasonable grounds upon which the Ministerial satisfaction can be
based.
A little reflection will demonstrate that it is the French rather
than the English law that is the more sound in its approach to the
question under discussion. No one doubts, it is true, that Parliament can, in the British system, vest any Minister with unlimited
discretion free from all judicial control. The only question is
whether, in a statute wich provides for a Minister to be satisfied
165. Rollo v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, [1948] 1 All
E. R. 13, 15 (C.A. 1947). See also Swindon Corp. v. Pearce and Pugh,
[1948] 2 K. B. 301, 303.
166. Hamson, Executive Discretion and Judicial Control 15 (1954)
167 Id. at 16.
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on a given issue, the legislature has done so.'0 "Now is it or is it
not tolerably certain that the majority in Parliament were not
aware of any such provision in the Bill when they passed it, and
that very few of those who were aware of it had any knowledge of
its effect?"'169 In view of all that has been said and written in recent
years about the dangers inheient in grants of uncontrolled discretion, it hardly seems reasonable to assume that the legislator intended such a grant where his intent has not been unmistakably
expressed. Where the enabling statute contains only language such
as that involved in the Robinson case, the legislature has not clearly expressed the purpose of completely and finally excluding all
control 'by the courts. For, let no mistake be made about it, such
complete exclusion is the effect of the type of provision we are
discussing, if Robinson's case is sound. As Sir David Maxwell Fyfe
has expressed it, the only question into which the courts can
inquire is the honesty of the Minister's satisfaction.17 0 And that
inquiry is, we have indicated, little more than a matter of form. To
quote Lord Radcliffe, "[T] he field in which this kind of question
arises is such that the reservation for the case of bad faith is hardly
more than a formality."'"-Provisions of the type under discussion appear to have made
their way into the English system primarily during the last war,
although there were some such provisions even in the pre-war
statute book. The Defence Regulations issued during and since the
war have literally abounded in language vesting subjective discretion in Ministers, by expressions similar to that in the statute construed in the Robinson case. And, during the war, it was not unnatural for the courts to accept the premise that the emergency was
so great that they should do nothing to interfere with the exercise
of these powers. In the apt language of Lord Macmillan, "In a time
of emergency when the life of the whole nation is at stake it may
well be that a regulation for the defence of the realm may quite
properly have a meaning which because of its drastic invasion of
the liberty of the.subject the courts would be slow to attribute to a
peace time measure.'

1 72

The wartime attitude of the English courts is well shown by

the judgment of Lord Greene, M. R., in an important case in which
168. Paraphrasing Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A. C.

206,239 (1941).
169. Hewart, The New Despotism 71 (1929).
170. Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, [1951] A. C. 66,72 (P.C. 1950).
171. Id. at 77.
172. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A. C. 206, 251 (1941).
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the regulation at issue authorized the relevant Mimster to take
certain action "if it appears" to him that "in the interests of public
safety, the defence of the realm, or the efficient prosecution of the
war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life
of the community," it is necessary to do so. Lord Greene's language,
which was concurred in by the entire Court of Appeal, is extreme
in its denial of any possibility of judicial control (except perhaps
for the question of Ministerial good faith) "If one thing is settled
beyond the possibility of dispute," said his Lordship, "it is that, in
construing regulations of this character expressed in this particular
form of language, it is for the competent authority, whatever Miiistry that may be, to decide as to whether or not a case for the
exercise of the powers has arisen.
One thing is certain, and that
is that those matters are not within the competence of this court. It
is the competent authority that is selected by Parliament to come to
the decision, and, if that decision is come to in good faith, this
court has no power to interfere."' 78 From this and other cases, it
was clear that, where a wartime regulation committed to the satisfaction of an executive authority the decision of what was necessary
or expedient, it was not competent to the courts to investigate the
grounds or the reasonableness of the decision.17 4 Indeed, as is well
known, in Lversidge v. Anderson 7 5 the House of Lords went so
far as to reach this result under a regulation which authorized certain action, "if the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe," despite the clear demonstration in Lord Atkin's dissenting
opinion that this language imported an objective rather than a subjective test, i.e., the existence of "reasonable cause" was an objective fact which could be inquired into by a reviewing court.
What makes these wartime cases of such significance is the fact
that, as a recent report points out, the sort of formula which was
held, during the war, to preclude judicial inquiry has been repeated
in a number of statutes and statutory orders enacted after the war
came to an end. 7 6 And the courts have continued to rely on the
rationale of the wartime cases in holding, as in Robinson's case, that
formulae which commit the taking of action to the satisfaction of the
relevant authority bar judicial inquiry into the basis of such satisfaction even in peacetime. This is clearly shown by the reply of
173. Point of Ayr Collieries, Ltd., v. Lloyd George, [19431 2 All E. R.
546, 547 (C.A.).
174. Carltona, Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works, [1943] 2 All E. R. 560.
564 (C.A.)
175. [1942] A. C. 206 (1941).
176. Rule of Law 17, op. cit. supra note 38.
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Somervell, L. J., to the contention that the wartime decisions must
be limited to cases involving regulations for what may be described
as war purposes. "I do not so construe these authorities," declared
his Lordship. "It must.
be obvious that Parliament can confer
the same unlimited discretion on Mimsters for purposes other than
war purposes. Construing the words in their natural meaning and
in the light of the authorities, I think Parliament has done so in
this part of this Act."'-,With respect, it is suggested that the learned judge was incorrect in assuming that the cases construing the Defence Regulations
must necessarily govern cases which are decided after the conflict
has ceased. It is one thing to hold that the legislature has intended
to vest all but unlimited discretion in an administrative authority
to deal with a war emergency; it is quite another matter to make
the same holding with regard to a statute enacted to meet the lesser
exigencies of more normal periods, where that result is not compelled by the language of the legislator. "The validity of action
under the war power," Mr. Justice Frankfurter well informs us,
"must be judged wholly in the context of war. That action is not
to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in time of peace
would be lawless."'7 s Similarly, the vesting of unchallengeable discretion is not to be justified in peace time just because a like grant
may be one of the necessities generated by war.
A valuable analogy may be found in the postwar reception
given to language like that in the regulation at issue in Liversidge
v. Anderson. The decision of the House of Lords in that case, as
has been mentioned, held that a regulation, giving the Secretary of
State power to take action if he "has reasonable cause to believe"
certain conditions existed, vested an unreviewable discretion in the
Secretary What is particularly significant for our purposes is the
complete preclusion of judicial control which results from their
Lordships' judgments. Such preclusion is not merely implicit in
those judgments but is candidly expressed as their underlying purpose. "To my mind," asserted Viscount Maugham, "this is so clearly
a matter for executive discretion and nothing else that I cannot
myself believe that those responsible for the Order in Council could
have contemplated for a moment the possibility of the action of the
Secretary of State being-subject to the discussion, criticism and
control of a judge in a court of law."' 7 And this in the face of the
177. [1947] K. B. at 721.
178. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214,224 (1944).
179.

[1942] A. C. at 220.
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requirement of "reasonable cause" in Regulation 18B which Lord
Atkin amply proves has always involved an objective test, by an
independent tribunal, of the reasonableness claimed for the conduct
which is impugned. 180 Under the majority decision in Liversidge,v.
Anderson, the words "reasonable cause," as Lord Radcliffe has put
it, "meant no more than that the Secretary of State had honestly to
suppose that he had reasonable cause to believe the required thing.
On that basis, granted good faith, the maker of the order appears to
be the only possible judge of the conditions of his own jurisdiction."""'
Words such as those in Regulation 18B are "commonly found
when a legislature or law-making authority confers powers on a
minister or official." 182 And it is this which has led to the fear that
the House of Lords decision might serve as an unwholesome precedent which might have a permanently damaging effect upon judicial review It is difficult to see, writes Sir Carleton Allen, why thc
Lverszdge holding "should not apply just as forcibly to a policeman as to a Cabinet Minister, or why the policeman should not
say 'I am required to have reasonable cause. Well, after mature
reflection, I came to the conclusion that I had reasonable cause.
That element was present to my mind and determined my belief
and conduct. I have satisfied the condition.' Perhaps some day, on
the strength of Lwversidge v. Anderson, some enterprising counsel
will have the hardihood to advance this argument in a case of false
imprisonment.'

83

Sir Carleton's prediction has not proved unfounded, for, in
1950, a counsel did actually urge that the Liversidge doctrine
applied whenever language like that in Regulation 18B was found.
This contention was made in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratnc,'8' where
the relevant regulation empowered the Controller of Textiles in
Ceylon to revoke a textile dealer's license where he "has reasonable
grounds to believe" the licensee is unfit to continue as a dealer
Counsel for the Controller relied squarely on the Liversidge case,
asserting that "The Controller comes into the category of persons
who should be allowed a subjective test, that test should be whether
he honestly believes, or honestly is of opinion, that he had reasonable
grounds to believe."' 5 In a most significant portion of his opinion,
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Allen, op. cit. supra note 1,at 333.
Nakkuda Ali v.Jayaratne, [1951] A. C.66, 76 (P.C.1950)
Id. at 77
Allen, op. cit. supra note 1, at 336.
[19511 A. C.66 (P.C.1950)
[19511 A. C.at 72.
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Lord Radcliffe, who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee, refised to adopt the Liversidge construction. "Indeed," said
he, "it would be a very unfortunate thing if the decision of Liversidge's case... came to be regarded as laying down any general
rule as to the construction of such phrases when they appear in
statutory enactments."'8 8 There is no general principle that the
words "if the Minister has reasonable cause to believe" are to be
understood as the House of Lords construed them in Liversidge.
Instead, in the normal case, "they must be intended to serve in
some sense as a condition limiting the exercise of an otherwise arbitrary power. But if the question whether the condition has been
satisfied is to be conclusively decided by the man who wields the
power the value of the intended restraint is in fact nothing.
Their lordships therefore treat the words in reg. 62, 'where the Controller has reasonable grounds to believe 'that any dealer is unfit to
be allowed to continue as a dealer' as imposing a condition that
there must in fact exist such reasonable grounds, known to the
Controller, before he can validly exercise the power. .. ,,87
If Liversidge v. Andersoi will not be followed outside the context of a war emergency, why should not the same be true of the
wartime cases construing the effect of Defence Regulations committing the taking of action to the satisfaction of the relevant administrative authority? Those cases, too, need not be understood as
laying down any general rule as to the construction of similar provisions when they appear in ordinary statutes. In cases which do not
involve war powers, the courts should say, with Lord Justice Denning, "I do not agree with the contention that, once the Minister
says he is satisfied, these courts cannot look behind it to see what
he is doing."' 8 It is true that, in these, as in other administrativelaw cases the courts should not arrogate to themselves an appellate
jurisdiction over the administration. It is not for them to determine
whether the Minister was correct in being satisfied on the facts
before him. But this does not mean the elimination of that supervising and correcting function of the Queen's Bench Division which
Morris, L. J., has recently referred to as "one of the bulwarks of our
liberties.' 8 9 That the statute authorizes the authority concerned to
act if satisfied that a specified condition exists should not bar judi186. Id. at 76.
187. Id. at 77.
188. Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. v. Minister of Town
and Country Planning, [1951] 2 K. B. 284;311 (C.A.).
189. Point of Ayr Collienes, Ltd. v. Lloyd George, [1943] 2 All E. IL
546, 547 (C.A.).
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cial inquiry into the question of vires-to see, as Lord Greene lmmself has admitted, "that the action is one which is within the four
corners of the authority delegated to the Minister."' 190 And, as in
other review cases, the supervisory authority of the courts should
not be limited to the bare question of jurisdiction. Thus, the courts
should be able to intervene despite the statutory provision, if there
has been a misdirection by the Minister as to the law, error of law
can, we have seen, be gone into tinder the "excess of jurisdiction"
theory upon which the supervisory power of the Queen's Bench is
based.
That brings us to the crux of the matter, can the judge go into
the question of evidentiary support for the Minister's satisfaction
Robinson's case tells us that the courts are precluded from such inquiry It is, however, suggested that such a construction is not compelled by statutory provisions of the type under discussion. It is
inconsistent with the probable intent of the legislator to hold that
the grant of authority to act if satisfied that a specified condition
exists vests in the governmental organ concerned the power to act
where there is no reasonable basis for being satisfied that the cotidition exists. On the contrary, if it appears, in Lord Reid's
phrase,' 9' that the authority's satisfaction was so unreasonable as to
be perverse, Parliament could hardly have intended its decision to
be conclusive. In other words, in cases where the Minister is given
power to act "if satisfied" (as in the case of a provision like that
construed in the Nakkuda Ali case) there is the implied condition
that in fact, reasonable grounds exist for the Ministerial satisfaction.
This, it appears to the present writer, is the proper construction of
such a statutory formula, and if that is true, the courts on review
should be able to require the Minister to show that there was in fact
some evidence on which he could be satisfied.
It must, of course, be recognized that the present case-law, and
particularly the Robinson case, is the other way The judicial
abnegation in the face of formulae of the type under discussion is.
indeed, a matter of great moment. It enables Ministers, impatient of
judicial control, to persuade Parliament to vest in them subjective
discretions without having to defend provisions so blatant in their
preclusion of access to the courts as the "conclusive evidence" clause
which the Committee on Ministers' Powers so rightly condemned. 2
If the Robinson holding is correct, and there is to be no judicial in190. Thorneloe and Clarkson v. Board of Trade, [19501 2 All. E. R. 245.
247 (K.B.D.).
191. Demetriades v. Glasgow Corp., [1951] 1 All E. R. 457, 463 (H.L.)
192. See Griffith and Street. op cit. supra note 7, at 215.

ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEH'

quiry in these cases, then the structures of the Donoughmore Committee did not, as had been hoped, all but eliminate the conclusive
evidence clause from English administrative law. It has reappeared
in the statute book m a new form; but the substance, the elimination
of all judicial control of consequence, is the sane. As it has been
aptly expressed by a recent commentator, "the Pilate-like handwashing by the courts.-when faced with a decision of a Minister
-acting under an 'if he is satisfied' power amounts almost to a refusal to accept a responsibility which hitherto it was thought the
Constitution had imposed on the judges as part of their function." 103
DIScRETIONARY POWERS

The control of -discretionary power is in many ways the crucial
question of modem administrative law. It is intimately connected
with the extent to which legislative limitations are imposed upon
delegations of authority to the administration. "The precise limits of
a law-making power which Parliament intends to confer on a
Minister should always be expressly defined in clear language by
the statute which confers it: when discretion is conferred its limits
should be defined with equal clearness."'' 4 This principle, so aptly
stated by the Committee on Ministers' Powers, is of vital importance
in the English system. It is only with reference to parliamentary
limitations upon delegations of power that judicial control can be
asserted in Britain through the doctrine of ultra vires. Where the
powers delegated confer so wide a discretion upon the administration that it is almost impossible to know what limits the legislator
intended to impose, there can be to all practical intents and purposes no effective judicial control. In such a case, to borrow from a
famous opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo, the delegated power is not
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing; it is unconfined and vagrant. 95 The vires have become so broad as to
validate almost all'conceivable administrative action.
Statutes of the type discussed in the preceding section are good
illustrations of the above point. If a statute is interpreted as vesting
the power to act in the subjective satisfaction of the Minister, there
is practically no scope for effective judicial control of the Ministerial
discretion. If the power is construed as "subjective," it is enough
that the Minister should honestly believe that the condition of its
exercise is fulfilled, and his statement that he does so believe is
193. Griffith, Note, 18 Modern L. Rev. 159, 162 (1955).
194. Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 65 (Cmd. 4060,
1932).
195. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 551
(1935).
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conclusive, subject to the purely theoretical possibility of proving
bad faith in the Minister. "90 It is only if, as in the Nakkuda Ali
case, the power conferred is deemed "objective" that unlimited discretion is not conferred, in such a case, the reviewing court can
determine whether there is in fact an evidentiary basis for the
Ministerial satisfaction.
The problem of subjective discretion, it should be noted, is not
as pressing in the United States as it is in Britain. The reason for
this is that, except where a statute has been deemed wholly to preclude judicial review, the American courts have asserted the
authority to determine whether discretionary powers have been
abused.1 97 The Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 expressly confirms the judicial authority in this respect, for it empowers the reviewing court to set aside administrative action found
to constitute an abuse of discretion.108 When will discretion be
deemed abused in the American system The courts have said that
such is the case when the discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner. As a general proposition, the power of the American reviewing court where discretion is
concerned is basically similar to its power of inquiry into questions
of fact and so-called mixed questions of law and fact. In all of these
cases, the court determines whether the particular administrative
finding or conclusion is reasonable in the light of the evidence in
the record. Consequently, where the exercise of discretionary authority is challenged, the American reviewing court can determine
whether there is a rational basis for the manner in which the administrator exercised the particular power.
In the English, as in the American, system, the courts have tried
to control administrative discretionary powers by the concept of
abuse of discretion. As Lord Halsbury, L. C., put it, in an oft-cited
passage, "'discretion' means when it is said that something is to
be done within the discretion of the authorities that that something
is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion.
It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and
-199
fanciful.
196. See Hamson and Le Tourneur, The Control of Discretionary
Executive Powers in France, 11 Camb. L. J. 258, 262-63 (1952).
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There is an additional exception under the Administrative Proce-

dure Act "so far as agency action is by law committed to agency discretion."

60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5U. S. C. 1009 (introductory clause) (1952). The sig-

nificance of this exception is doubtful in view of the express provision il that
Act, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U. S. C. 1009 (e) (1952), permitting the reviewing court to set aside agency action for abuse of discretion.
198. Section 10(e) (B) (1)
199. Sharp v. Wakefield. [18911 A. C. 173, 179.
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The concept of abuse of discretion in Britain can be directly
compared with that in the United States in an important class of
cases, namelr those involving review of local authorities. The English courts have for many years asserted a power to inquire into
the reasonableness of the action of such authorities.
The leading postwar case is Associated Provincial Picture
Houses,Ltd. v. Wednwsbury, Corp.,20 0 a 1947 decision of the Court
of Appeal. The plaintiff there sought a declaration that a condition
imposed by defendant local authority upon a license granted to
plaintiff for cinema performances on Sunday, under which "no
children under the age of fifteen years shall be admitted to any
entertainment whether accompanied by an adult or not," was ultra
vires and unreasonable. In the course of his judgment, Lord Greene,
M. R., indicated clearly that the court could examine the reasonableness of the challenged condition. Though the relevant statute "0
allowed the authority to grant the license "subject to such conditions as the authority think fit to impose," the discretion thus conferred was one which, in his Lordship's words, must be exercised
reasonably.202 If this were a case where one could "say that, although the local authority have kept within the .four comers of the
matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come
to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could
ever -have come to it. . . I think the court can interfere."20
It is true, as Lord Greene takes pains to underline, that review of
reasonableness does not enable the court to decide the correctness of
the local authority's decision to act as it did. The "proposition that
the decision of the local authority can be upset if it is proved to be
unreasonable, really meant that it must be proved to be unreasonable
in the sense that the court considers it to be a decision that no
reasonable body could have to come to. It is not what the court considers unreasonable, a different thing altogether.... The effect of
the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the
correctness of one view over another. It is the local authority that
are set n that position... ,"204 In the case under discussion, it can
hardly be said that the condition at issue was so unreasonable that
no reasonable authority would have imposed it. There was, in the
view of the Court of Appeal, a direct rational relationship between
the condition and the purposes for which the licensing power was
200. [1948] 1K. B. 223 ,(C.A. 1947).
201. Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932 §1 (1).
202. [1948] 1 K. B. at 229.
203. Id. at 234.
204. Id. at 230.
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conferred. "It appears to me quite clear," states Lord Green, "that
the matter dealt with by this condition was a matter which a reasonable authority would be justified in considering when they were
making up their mind what condition should be attached to the
grant of this license. Nobody, at this time of day, could say that the
well-being and the physical and moral health of children is not a
matter which a local authority, in exercising their powers, can
properly have in mind when those questions are germane to what
205
they have to consider."
Though the case just discussed upheld the authority, the Opinion

of Lord Greene clearly indicates that the English courts can inquire
into the reasonableness of exercises of discretionary power by local
authorities. It is usually said, however, that, in the English system,
judicial authority to examine directly into reasonableness is limited
to cases involving review of the action of local authorities. There is
said to be no overriding power in English courts to decide what is
reasonable and what is unreasonable where discretionary powers are
exercised by Ministers or other agents of the central government.
This does not mean that the concept of abuse of discretion is inapplicable to organs directly responsible to the government at Westminster. Agencies of the central government vested with discretionary authority are not permitted to do as they please in exercising
such power. The English courts will, on the contrary, intervene to
insure that the agency concerned has taken into account all relevant
considerations (and no others) and that the discretion has beenm
exercised for a proper purpose. 20 6 If an extraneous consideration
or an improper purpose has induced the administrative act at issue,
an abuse of discretion will be found. The basis for such judicial
finding has been well stated by Lord Justice Denning "In order
that a power should be genuinely exercised, the administrator must
have the proper state of mind-the state of mind which Parliament
expects him to have-the state of mind of an administrator who
carefully investigates all the relevant considerations and rejects all
irrelevant ones,
and thereupon after due consideration [will]
come to an honest decision as to whether to exercise the power.
or not, for the purpose authorized by Parliament.

'
207,

A 1949 case illustrating judicial intervention where the administrator has acted on extraneous considerations is Pillinq v
Abergele Urban District Council.200 It arose under that section of
205. Id. at 229-30.
206. See Griffith and Street. op. cit. supranote 7, at 215.
207 Denning, Freedom under the Law 122 (1949)
208. [1950] 1 K. B. 636 (1949).
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the Public Health Ac, 1936, which empowers a local authority to
grant "licences authorizing persons to allow land occupied by them
... to be used as sites for movable dwellings." In the Pilling case,
a local authority refused to grant a license under this section on
the ground "that the site is unsuitable because such use would be
detrimental to the amenities of the district particularly on account
of the close proximity of other dwellings." In his opinion, concurred in by the other members of the Divisional Court, Lord
Goddard, C. J., states that what the authority did here was to refuse
the license "for what may compendiously be called town-planning
reasons," 20 9 can they consider such matters in exercising their discretion to grant or refuse a license? "I have always understood the
law to be," declares his Lordship, "that, where a duty to hear and
determine a question is conferred on a tribunal of any kind, or on
a local authority, they state their reasons for their decision and the
reasons which they state show that they have taken into account
matters which they ought not to have taken into account, or that
they have failed to take matters into account which they ought to
. can and ought to adjudicate
have taken into account, the court
on the matter."2 10 In this case, the relevant statute, the Public
Health Act, 1936, concerned only matters relating to health and
sanitation, and the discretion given was one to consider those matters only in a license application case. "I think that the discretion
which the section gives to the local authority is to consider such
an application for the grant of a license from the point of view of
public health and the sanitary conditions at the site, and that they
are not, entitled under this section to take into account the question
of local amenities. 2 1 Since the authority had acted on what the
court held to be an extraneous matter, its action was invalid.
Where a Minister or other governmental authority is vested by
Parliament with subjective discretion, it would seem that the rule
barring consideration of extraneous matters becomes inapplicable.
In such a case, the English courts tend to say that it is the legislative intention that the administrator can take into account any
matters that he thinks fit.2 1 2 This is well shown by Swindon Corporation v. Pearce and PuIgl,2 1 3 where the enabling statute (the
Town and Country Planning Act, 1932) authorized an interim development authority to prohibit by order development of land, in
209. Id. at 637.
210. Ibid.

211. Id. at 639.
212. Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 218.
213. [1948] 2 K B. 301.
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an area with respect to which a resolution to prepare or adopt a
scheme under the Act was in force, "if they are satisfied that it is
necessary or expedient to do so." In the case referred to, the court
held that the considerations which moved the authority to issue an
order prohibiting development could not be inquired into on review "It is, we think evident," reads the judgment of the court,
"that Parliament meant those matters to be left to the decision of the
authority It is for them to consider, and not for a court, what
it is desirable should be done or not done in relation to these
'1' 4
schemes. 1
Even in a case like Sztndon Corporation v.Pearce and Pugh,
where the discretion conferred is construed by the English courts
as more or less subjective, the reviewing court can intervene if the
discretion is exercised for an improper purpose. The basic principle which has gradually been developed in English administrative
law is, to quote Lord Justice Denning, "that the courts will always
be prepared to look into the purpose with which the executive
exercise their powers and will not allow them to be used for any
purpose other than that for which they are conferred."2101 The rule
of improper purpose is an implied limitation upon all grants of
discretionary authority, though such grant may seem to be unlimited
and even subjective in terms. As a leading treatise puts it, "even
though a discretion is expressed in unqualified terms the statute
must be taken to read that the discretion must be exercised for the
purposes contemplated by the statute, and what these purposes
210
are it is for the court to ascertain.
A recent case which well shows the application of the rule of improper purpose in practice is Prescott v'. Birimngham Corpora12 7
tson.
In that case, which bids fair to become one of the most
significant of postwar English administrative law decisions, the
defendant municipal corporation owned and operated a passenger
road transport undertaking and was empowered to charge fares
to passengers travelling upon their vehicles. Its city council adopted
a scheme to provide free travel facilities on the corporation's omnibuses on every day except Saturday between 10 A.M and 4 P.M. for
old people resident in the city who were receiving retirement or old
age pensions or national assistance payments. The cost of the
214.
215.
216.
217

Id. at 310.
Denning, op. cit. supra note 207, at 114-15.
Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 215.
[1954] 3 Weekly L. R. 990 (C.A.) afflrming [19541 3 Weekly L. R.

600 (Ch.D.).
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scheme was estimated at about 90,000 pounds per year (that being
the loss of income expected from the operation of the scheme). Such
sum was to be paid out of the general rate fund. The plaintiff, a
rate-payer of the city, sought a declaratory judgment that the
scheme in question was illegal and ultra vires. A declaration of
illegality was granted by Vaisey, J., and his judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Appeal.
It should be noted that the relevant statute in the Prescott case
empowered the defendant corporation to "demand and take for
passengers and parcels carried on such vehicles such fares and
charges as they inay think fit."""8 But the fact that the statutory
language could be said to grant subjective discretion did not mean
that the discretion conferred could be exercised for an improper
purpose. And, according to the Court of Appeal, such exercise for
an improper purpose was exactly what defendant's scheme for free
transportation for old persons amounted to. What the defendant
did was to form the opinion that old people who met the conditions
specified ought to be allowed free travel facilities and to adopt the
scheme giving effect to that opinion. "If we are right," states Jenkins, L. J., who read the judgment of the court, "in thinking that
...the defendants owe a duty to their ratepayers to operate their
transport undertaking substantially on business lines, we think it
must necessarily follow that, in adopting the scheme, the defendants
misapprehended the nature and scope of the discretion conferred on
them, and mistakenly supposed that it enabled them to confer
benefits in the shape of rights of free travel on any class or classes
of the local inhabitants appearing to them to be deserving of such
benefits by reason of their advanced age and limited means. 21 0
The statute authorizing defendant corporation to operate its transport undertaking intended that the undertaking was to be run as a
business venture or, in other words, that the fares were to be fixed
in accordance with ordinary business principles. In the present
case, however, the defendant had exercised its discretionary power
to -fix the fares for a wholly different purpose: defendant had, in
effect, made a gift to a particular class of persons of rights of free
travel "simply because the local authority concerned are of opinion
that the favoured class of persons ought on benevolent or philanthropic grounds to be accorded that benefit." 220 Such "benevolent
or philanthropic" purpose was, in the opinion of the court, clearly
218. Emphasis added.
219. [1954] 3 Weekly L. R at 1003-04 (C.A.).
220. Id. at 1002.
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not that for which defendant's rate-fixing power had been conferred.221
The cases just discussed, and particularly Prescott v. Btrinngham Corporation, show how the English courts seek to control
administrative discretionary powers, even those that are seemingly
absolute on their face. One may, it is true, disagree with the way
in which the rule of improper purpose was applied to the specific
circumstances in the Prescott case, but the decision of the Court
of Appeal does clearly give the lie to any suggestion that there is
such a thing as wholly uncontrolled and absolute discretion in English administrative law 222 Though the power vested may be tinqualified and even subjective on its face, it is still limited by the
rule of improper purpose. The reviewing court will determine for
itself the purpose or purposes for which the power at issue was
conferred by the legislature and will then decide whether the particular exercise of the power was intended to fulfill the legislative
purpose or was rather done for an end other than that for which
the power was conferred. In the Prescott case, the court found that
the challenged administrative scheme was adopted to promote
philanthropic ends which the legislature could not have intended,
the scheme was consequently declared illegal.
It has already been pointed out that the English courts, unlike
those in the United States, do not have the general authority to rule
upon the reasonableness of administrative exercises of discretionary
power, at least where the action of local authorities is not at issue.
At the same time, we have seen, the reviewing court in Britain can,
in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, inquire whether the agency concerned has acted upon extraneous
considerations and whether the power conferred has been used for
an improper purpose. In making such inquiry, the court may, in
actuality, come close to being a judge of reasonableness. In Prescott
v. Btrnnngham Corporation, the court held that the power to fix
fares could not be used for so-called philanthropic purposes. Its
decision to that effect was, in substance, if not in form, based upon
the view that it was unreasonable to exercise the power for such a
purpose. Similarly, in a case like Pillingv. Abergele Urban District
Council, it can be said that it was unreasonable for the authority
concerned to take into account an extraneous matter, i.e., one
which the legislature did not intend should be taken account of.
221. As Griffith, Note, 18 Modern L. Rev. 159, 161-62 (1955), points
out, the decision of the Court of Appeal is comparable to Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A. C. 578, especially at 594-95.
222. Compare Griffith and Street, op. cit. supra note 7, at 215.
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That there is, in fact, a close relation betveen review of reasonableness and review to determine whether powers have been exercised for an improper purpose or upon extraneous considerations
was acutely perceived by Lord Greene, M. R. "Lawyers," said his
Lordship in a case already discussed, "often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been
used and is frequently used as a general description of the things
that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a
discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He
must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to
consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which
are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those
rules, he may truly be said . . to be acting 'unreasonably.' ""
Lord Greene goes on to give, as an illustration, the case of a teacher
dismissed because she has red hair. "That is unreasonable in one
sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration extraneous
matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as
being done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one
another." ' -24
When we say that the administrator has acted unreasonably, we
mean that there is no rational connection between what he has
done and what the legislature intended him to do. When is the
required rational relation lacking? It would seem that such is the
case when the administrator has used his power for a purpose other
than that contemplated by the legislature or when he has been induced to act by matters which the legislature did not intend him to
take into account. If that is true, then the English courts do, in fact
if not in form, rule upon the reasonableness of administrative exercises of discretionary power, even in cases other than those involving the acts of local authorities. That being the case, it may be seen
that the English and American concepts of abuse of discretion really
run into one another. It is true that the courts in Britain, unlike
their counterparts in the United States, claim that an administrative act does not constitute an abuse of discretion merely because a
judge considers it unreasonable. But an administrative act is unreasonable, we have seen, because it does not conform to the legislative purpose or because it has been based upon extraneous considerations. By asserting their power to intervene if powers have
been used for an improper purpose or the agency concerned has
223. Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp.,
[1948] 1 K. B. 223,229 (C.A. 1947).
224. !Id.
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taken into account matters which should not have been considered.
the English courts are actually coming very close to ruling upon the
reasonableness of challenged exercises of discretionary power
Dttournement de Pouvoir

In his 1949 Hamlyn Lectures, Lord Justice Denning compared
the rule of improper purpose developed to control the exercise ot
administrative discretionary powers in Britain with the doctrine of
dgtournement de pouvoir fashioned for a similar end by the Conseil
d'Etat in France. As stated by him, under the French doctrine, the
"courts insist that a public authority must exercise its powers
genuinely in the public interest. The courts will therefore look int
the intention with which the act was done and if it was done with
a motive, or for an end, other than that for which the power wa.,
conferred, it will be held to be bad." 225 According to the leariied
judge, English administrative law is now developing the same prin
22
ciple along parallel lines. 6
A case like Prescott v. Birmingham Corporationseems to bear
out this conclusion of Denning, L. J In it, the English court conducted an inquiry not unlike that which the Conseil d'Etat would
make in a ditournernent de pouvoir case. Under the theory that the
French tribunal has developed, the administration's powers have
been delegated to it by the legislature with certain goals in view
To deviate from those goals is to abuse the power conferred. Dtournement de pouvoir is thus the use by the administrator of his
authority for an illicit purpose, a purpose other than that which the
legislator intended. To determine whether such abuse of power
has been committed, the French reviewing court must search out
what were the intentions of the author of the challenged act, what
was the result that he meant to effect, and it must then determine
whether or not his purpose was legitimate. 2 This is very similar
to the inquiry made by the English court in the Prescott case.
There, too, the judge sought out the purpose behind the administrative scheme at issue and determined whether or not that purpose
was one other than those which the legislature had in mind. There
is little doubt, indeed, that a French administrative lawyer would
classify Prescott v.Birmingham Corporationas a d tournernent de
pouvoir case. The Conseil d'Etat, if an analogous fact pattern were
presented to it, would invalidate the challenged scheme because the
225. Denning, op. cit. supra note 207, at 115.
226. Id. at 116.
227 For a more detailed discussion of the French law, see Schwartz.
French Administrative Law and the Common-Law World 216-25 (1954)
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mumcipal corporation, however laudable its actual aim, had used its
authority for a purpose other than that which the legislature had
in mind.
Though the English rule of improper purpose is thus similar
to the French doctrine of ditournement de pouvoir, that does not
mean that reviewing courts in both countries will reach the same
results in analogous cases. On the contrary, the courts in Britain
are much more cautious in their approach in these cases than are
their counterparts on the other side of the Channel. "If theoretically," Professor Hamson informs us, "the doctrine of ultra vires
includes the cas d'ouverture known in France as d6toiurnewent de
pouvoir, -in practice the doctrine as applied falls far short of the
practical results attained in France even on that ground of annul22 8
ment."
The difference between the English and French approach to
cases involving alleged abuses of discretion is strikingly exemplified
by the decision of the House of Lords in Earl Fitawilliam'sWentworth Estates Co. v. Minister of Town and Country Plammig.22
That case arose out of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947,
and, in order to make the issue presented intelligible, it is necessary
first to outline the broad effect and scheme of the Act.220 The effect
of the 1947 Act has been well stated by Denning, L. J-, who characterized that law as "a revolution in itself. It takes away the freedom
of each man to do as he likes with his own land. No one can now
develop his land, or make any material change in the use of it,
without the permission of the planning authority; and if he is given
permission, he must pay for the privilege. He must pay a charge to
the Land Board which is calculated by reference to the increase
in value of the land owing to his being allowed to develop it. For
instance, if it is being used for agriculture-so that that is its existing use-and he desires to build on it, he must pay the board its
development value, that is, its value as building land less its value
as agricultural land. Its building value may be much higher than
its agricultural value because it is near to any expanding town or
to a new road made by the community. This increase in value is
as a rule due to no effort by the landowner, but to the efforts of the
community; and Parliament has determined to recover it for the
State by imposing a development charge." 23
'
228. Hamson, op. cit. supra note 166, at 166.
229. [1952] A. C. 362 (1951).
230. Paraphrasmg Somervell, L. J., m Earl Fitzvilliam's Wentworth
Estates Co. v. Minister of Town and Country Planning, [1951] 2 IC.B. 284,
289 (C.A.).
231. Id. at 301.
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Realizing that the provisions of the Act were not entirely fair to
landowners, Parliament provided that they should be compensated
for the loss which the imposition of the development charge inflicted upon them. Such compensation was to be made from a fund
of 300,000,000 pounds set aside for the purpose. It was, however,
recognized that the fund would not be sufficient to compensate all
landowners for all their loss, but only some of them for some of it.
"Hence," Lord Justice Denning points out, "the trouble in this case.
The landowner wishes to throw the deficiency on the purchaser,
whereas the board say that the landowner should bear it himself."""3
The board referred to is the Central Land Board, the agency established to administer the scheme set up by the 1947 Act. The Board's
functions under the Act have been characterized as of a fiscal
nature. "3 3 They had to assess and collect the development charge
on new development, and to assess the compensation payable to
landowners out of the 300,000,000 pounds fund.
The key to the Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estate Co. case is
to be found in the fact already referred to that the compensation
provided by Parliament was not adequate to make individual landowners whole for the loss they were expected to stiffer from the
operation of the Act. A landowner who contracted to sell his land
would, not unnaturally, seek to throw the loss on the purchaser by
requiring him to pay the full building value of the land (in which
case the purchaser would be given the landowner's claim upon the
fund of 300,000,000 pounds, which would not, however, equal the
development charge which the purchaser would have to pay in order
to use the land as building land). The Central Land Board had.
however, as the already cited passage by Denning, L.

J.,

2- 34

indicates,

decided that the landowner should bear the deficiency himself, on
the ground that a sale of land at a price which included building
value was unfair to buyers, who, in effect, were forced to pay for
building value twice over in two immediate payments (i.e.. the
purchase price and the development charge) In a circular issued
by it entitled "Advice on buying and selling a site for building a
house," the Board had enunciated the policy of "sales at existing
use value only" They laid it down as their policy that a landowner
must sell his land at its existing use value only, and they went on
to state that they would use their powers of compulsory purchase
to make him do so.
232. Id. at 302.
233. Ibid.
234. See note 232 supra.
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The Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. case arose because the Central Land Board did carry out the threat contained
in their circular. The applicants had refused to lease a plot of land
which they owned on which to build a house except for a term of
300 years and at a rent which was conceded to be far in excess of
the existing use value of the land, and subject to the condition that
the lessee should pay the development charge in return for having
assigned to him the landowners' claim on the 300,000,000 pound
fund for compensation for loss of development value. The prospective tenant refused these terms, and, having obtained from the local
authority a permit to build, applied to the Central Land Board for
assistance. The Board sent the landowners its circular setting forth
its policy at sales at existing use value only. It was, to quote Denning, L. J., again, "framed in the forn of 'advice to the seller', but
the practical effect of it was to tell the landowner that. if he left
the purchaser to pay the development charge, he was to sell only at
existing use value, and that if he refused, the board would consider exercising their powers of compulsory purchase. He did refuse
3
and they did exercise their powers. Hence this action.11 1
Under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, the Central
Land Board was created as primarily a fiscal agency. But it was
also given, by section 43 of that statute, a power to acquire land
compulsorily By the first part of that section the Board may, with
the approval of the Minister of Town and Country Planning, by
agreement acquire land for any purpose connected with the performance of their functions under the following provisions of the
Act, and in particular, may so acquire any land for the purpose of
disposing of it for development for which permission had been
granted under Part III of the Act on terms inclusive of any development charge payable under those provisions in respect of that
development. By sub-section 2 the Minister is empowered to authorize the board to acquire the land compulsorily if he is satisfied
that it is expedient in the public interest that the board should do so,
and that they are unable to acquire the land by agreement on reasonable terms. By the "following provisions" of the Act the functions
of the board include that of ascertaining development values and of
fixing and collecting development charges.
In the EarlFitzwillian's Wentworth Estates Co. case, the landowners applied to have the compulsory purchase order quashed on
the ground that it was invalid, as not having been made for any
purpose connected with the Board's functions under the Act, but
235. [19511 2 K. B. at 308.
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for the purpose of enforcing the Board's policy of sales at existing
use values. In the course of the hearing before the Court of Appeal.
even the Attorney General did not deny that the dominant purpose
of the Central Land Board, if not their sole purpose, had been to
enforce the policy of sales at existing use value only "He said
boldly that, accepting that to be the purpose of the board, there was
nothing wrong about it." 2 0 Before the House of Lords, indeed, he
went even further and urged that the whole question of the motives
which had induced the Board to act was not open upon judicial review "In the exercise of statutory powers there must always be
some collateral purpose because they are always exercised for sonie
reason, but the judge of its propriety is the Minister. Nor will the
court inquire into the grounds which led the Minimster to hi,; con2 7
clusion unless his bona fides is challenged."1 11
To the comparative observer Earl FiI--williamn's II entworth
Estates Co is a striking illustration of a dWturnement de pouromr
case. "An administrative authority commits a dVtournement do,
potvoir," a prominent member of the French Conseil d'Etat Iiforms us, "when, though it performs an act within its jurisdiction.
observes the proper procedures, and respects the provisions of
statutes and regulations governing its actions, it uses its authority
for purposes other than those which the one delegating the authority
to it had in mind. Detourneinent de poivotr is a violation of thi
spirit of the law ,,2.s Was there such a violation of the spirit of the
law in the Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. case?
There is little doubt that the compulsory purchase order at issue
was intended primarily to promote the Central Land Board's policy
of sales at existing use value only it was because the landowner
refused to conform to the Board's policy that his land was taken
compulsorily at existing use value Even the Attorney General, we
have seen,2 39 did not seriously contend the contrary But the policy
of the Board was not one which had been laid down ainywhere in
its enabling legislation. On the contrary, Parliament nowhere
sought to enact what the Board had adopted as its policy "It did
not itself enact any positive law that land was to change hands at its
existing use value only nor did it authorize anyone else to make
such a law "0 It is true that Parliament might well have expected
that, after the 1947 Act was passed, land would ordinarily change
236. Id. at 301.
237 [19521 A. C. at 372.
238.
239.

240.

Odent, Cours de Contentiteux Admimstratif 357 (1949-50)
See note 232 supra.
[19511 2 K. B. at 309. per Dennimg. L. I.
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hands at its existing use value only. If a purchaser had to pay the
development value to the State, he would presumably only be willing to pay existing use value to the landowner. "But while it is
one thing to rely on economic forces, it is quite another thing to
impose a policy on the people by legal sanctions." 241 The latter was
something the legislator had clearly not attempted to do.
It is difficult to see how the facts in the Earl Fitzzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. case can be interpreted other than as indicating
the exercise by the Land Board of its power of compulsory purchase for a purpose other than those for which the power had been
conferred. As has been indicated, the legislature may well have
expected and even desired land to change hands at existing use
value after the 1947 Act. But it chose deliberately not to make any
positive legal enactment to that effect, instead, it relied on the
economic theory that the development charge would leave the
would-be developer unable or unwilling to pay more than existing
use value. The Earl Fitz-william's Wentworth Estates Co. case
arose because this economic theory did not work out in practice
and there were a large number of transactions in land in excess of
existing use value. "In an attempt to stop them the board have
rushed in where Parliament-I will not say feared to tread-but,
at any rate, did not tread."' 42 In exercising its power of compulsory
purchase to enforce its policy of sales at existing use value only.
the Board was using its authority to accomplish a purpose which
was not that of the legislator the policy it was enforcing was the
product of its own handiwork. Yet, by enforcing its policy, the
Board had, in truth, given it the same legal status as it would have
had had it been expressly enacted into positive law which, we have
seen. Parliament clearly did not do in the 1947 Act.
The real effect of the Board's action is well described by Lord
justice Denning. "It is, in its effect," he declares, "though not in
its terms, a claim by a government department to legislate. The
policy of 'sales at existing use value only' may be an excellent policy,
and a policy which it is very proper to encourage by economic
means; but once the board proclaim that they will use their compulsory powers to enforce it, then it ceases to be a policy and
becomes a law, and, be it noted, a law laid down by a government
department and not by Parliament. Though it is called advice, it
is nevertheless a rule of conduct which all landowners are expected
to obey, and, if they disobey, it is enforced by a powerful sanction,
241. Ibid.
242. Id. at 310.
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namely, compulsory purchase. A general rule of conduct of that
description, so enforced, is legislation and nothing else, and as such
it is invalid unless it has been enacted by Parliament, or by some
one to whom Parliament has delegated its legislative authority .""4
Being of this opinion, it is not surprising that Lord Justice
Denning goes on, in the judgment delivered by him in the Farl
Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. case, to assert the view that
the compulsory purchase order at issue there was unlawful. The
approach of the learned judge is basically similar to that which a
court follows under the ditournement de pouvoir doctrine developed
by the Conseil d'Etat in France. Like that tribunal, Lord justice
Denning inquires into the end which induced the administrative act
to determine whether it is one contemplated by the legislator "If
once it appears that the ultimate object of the board is one which
is not authorized by Parliament, then it is the duty of the courts
to interfere, for it is a principle of our law that a public authority,
which is entrusted with executive powers, must exercise those
powers genuinely for the purposes for which they are conferred.
They must not be used for an ulterior object, which is not authorized
by law, however desirable that object may seem to them to be in
the public interest. ' ' 2 4 4 In this case, concludes Denning, L. I., the

ultimate object of the Board was to enforce a policy which was not
contained in any statute. It was importing by implication into the
enabling legislation a restriction upon land contracts which Parliament had declined to impose expressly That being the case, the ultimate purpose of the Board is one which was not lawful. "If it is to
be the law of this country that landowners are to sell their land at
existing use values only, that law should be enacted by Parliament."

245

The present writer concurs without hesitation in the view recently expressed by Professor Hamson 24"1 that, in a case such as
Earl Fitzswllian's Wentworth Estates Co., the French Conseil
d'Etat would adopt Lord Justice Denning's opinion. In the English system, on the other hand, Lord justice Denning's views were
expressed in a dissenting opinion and it was the majority judgment
in the Court of Appeal, not Denning's dissent, that was affirmed
by the House of Lords. Neither the majority in the Court of Appeal
nor the House of Lords denied that the action of the Central Land
Board had been motivated by their desire to enforce their policy of
243. Id. at 311.
244. Id. at 313.
245. Id. at 314.
246. Hamson, op. ct. supra note 166, at 169.

ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

sales at existing use value only. In their view, however, the challenged order was also directly related to the functions of the Board
in connection with development charges. The prevailing view was
well expressed in the judgment of Lord Tucker- According to him,
"such a purchase was 'connected with' two functions of the Board,
viz., their function of assessing the development charge and their
function of collecting it. I think that unrestricted sales on a large
scale at prices in excess of existing use value would render more
difficult the proper ascertainment of the true existing use value,
which is a necessary element in calculating the development charge,
and that it being the function of the Board to collect the charge, to
set it against the payments which they will have to make out of the
£300 million compensation fund, a policy which tends to facilitate
and ensure a speedy payment of the charge by including it in the
sale price, is a policy the implementing of which is connected with
their fiscal functions under the Act. The declared policy of the Board
to discourage-by compulsory purchase if necessary-sales of land
at prices in excess of existing use value seems to me to be one which
the Act has empowered them to carry out, by conferring upon them
this power to acquire land for the purpose of disposing of it for
development for which permission has been granted at an inclusive
price, and it is impossible to say that purchases made for this purpose are ultra vires. . . ,1_17 Since, in this view, the compulsory
purchase order was, as required by the statute, "connected with"
the Board's functions under the Act, the fact that the Board might
have been moved by a purpose other than that for which its authority
was conferred was immaterial. "In these circumstances," states
Lord MacDermott, "it is, in my opinion, beside the point that, in
seeking to acquire land for the purpose thus stated, the members
of the Board, or some of them, may have been moved by consideraconstitute a
tions of policy which, in themselves, would not
purpose within the meaning of any part of section 43(1) ,,.-S
Though, as Denning, L. J., has pointed out,249 English administrative law may now be devoloping the principle of ditourncmnent
de pouvoir along lines parallel to its development in France, the
fact that both his colleagues on the Court of Appeal and the House
of Lords refused to follow his opinion in a case where, in Professor Hamson's words,250 the Conseil d'Etat would have regarded
his views as obvious and elementary, indicates that the English rule
247. [1952] A. C. at 386-87
248. Id.at 385.
249. See note 226 mipra.
250. Hanson, op. cit. mipra note 246.
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of improper purpose is not yet as far-reaching as the French doctrine of dctourneinent de pouvoir The decision in the Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. case appears to be based upon
the proposition that, once it is found that the administrator has
acted within his powers and in furtherance of a policy declared by
the legislature, it is irrelevant that he may also have been induced
by a policy other than that expressed in the Act. And it makes no
difference that the giving of effect to the latter policy was the administrator's predominant purpose. If the administrative act can be
seen to effect a purpose contemplated by the legislature, even
though that purpose may have been only an incidental one in the
mind of the administrator. it is immaterial that the administrator's
main purpose was, in fact, not clearly one for which the power was
conferred.
But it is precisely here that the approach of the English courts
falls short of that which is followed tinder the doctrine of dWtoitrnement de pouvoir As the opinion of Denning, L. I.,puts it, even
if the Central Land Board's desire to enforce their policy of sales
at existing use value only was "not their sole purpose, nevertheless
if it was their predominant purpose, as it clearly was, that is stifficient to invalidate their action."251 His Lordship here is actually
stating the French, not the English law Under the jurisprudence
of the Conseil d'Etat, an administrator who has been primarily
induced to act by an improper purpose is held to have committed a
d~tournement de pouvoir, even though his act was intra vires and
did actually promote a purpose contemplated by the legislature. 5 '
In one sense, the difference in approach as between the English
courts and the Conseil d'Etat in cases of the type tinder discussion
may be said to amount to a difference in emphasis with regard to the
burden of proof. In the English system, the administrator has discharged his burden if he can convince the court that his act could.
in fact, give effect to a purpose contemplated by the legislator if
that burden is met, the administrative act must be upheld, even if
the private party can show that the challenged act was predominantly motivated by an improper purpose. In the droit administratiJ.

on the other hand. it is the private party who discharges his burden
if he can show that the administrator was motivated by an improper purpose if that burden is met, the administrator cannot
prevail even if he can demonstrate that there may also be a direct
relation between his act and a purpose which the legislature had in
mind in delegating the power at issue.
251.
252.

[1951] 2 K. B. at 314.
See cases cited in Schwartz, op cit. supra note 227 at 217
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This difference in emphasis between the English and French
systems makes for a substantial difference in the degree of control
actually exercised over administrative discretionary power by reviewing courts. It should not be forgotten that, in these cases where
improper purpose is alleged, the private party is at best at a serious
disadvantage. It may be, as the celebrated statement of Bowen,
L. J., has it, that the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the
state of his digestion. To prove such a state is, however, quite another matter, particularly when the man whose state of mind is at
issue is a Minister or some other administrative official. Unless the
administrative purpose is clearly articulated in the order which is
challenged, it may be all but impossible to prove that the order was
motivated by an improper purpose. Where there is, as in the English system, no requirement that the administrator give any reasons
for his action, it is often not an easy matter to determine why ie
acted as he did.2 53 In such a case, the inquiry into whether there was
the necessary correlation between his purpose and that of the legislature cannot, as a practical matter, be made. And, even if the admimstrator states his reasons in a "speaking order", it is hardly
likely that, if he is motivated by an improper purpose, he will be so
naive as to admit it. He will disguise the true motives behind his
act and try to give some ostensible legal pretext. His ruse must be
unmasked, normally not a simple matter.254
For the party seeking review, it is always a most difficult task
to convince the court that the purpose behind an administrative act
was improper. Anglo-American courts are, in any event, most reluctant to engage in any investigation into the mental processes of
the administrator, where he has not articulated the motives for his
action. "According to an early English judge," the United States
Supreme Court has stated, " 'the devil himself knoweth not the mind
of man,' and a modem reviewing court is not much better equipped
to lay bare unexposed mental processes."255 How much more difficult is the task of the private party made by the interpretation of
the rule of improper purpose in the Earl FitzwiliaY's Wentiworth
Estates Co. case! Under the House of Lords decision, it is not
253. See the judgment of Birkett, J., in the Earl Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. case, [1951] 1 IC B. 203, 218, where the learned judge
emphasizes the fact that the Central Land Board nowhere stated directly
their reasons for making the challenged order.
254. Compare Waline, Traite Elementaire de Droit Admmistratif 144

(6th ed. 1951), where the author makes a similar statement with regard to

the efficacy in practice of the ditournement de pouvoir doctrine.

255. National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330
U. S. 219,229 (1947).
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enough that plaintiff shows that the administrator was motivated by
an improper purpose, he must also, in substance, exclude any possibility that the challenged act could give effect to a purpose authorized by the legislature. This is to impose a well-nigh unsupportable
burden upon the party seeking review, when, as indicated, his
chances of success are, at best, hardly very great in this type of case.
If the rule of improper purpose is to have the effect in the English
system that the d~tournement de pouvoir doctrine has in France, it
is preferable to follow Lord Justice Denning's approach in his Earl
Fitzwilliam's Wentworth Estates Co. dissent. Let the plaintiff
prove that the act at issue was substantially motivated by an ulterior
purpose (i,.e.. one not contemplated by the legislature), and he
should prevail in his review action. The basic problem in presentday administrative law is not to insure that adequate scope is given
to administrative discretion (the claims of the administrator in this
respect have long since been recognized), but how to control effectively discretionary powers which appear unlimited on their face.
The rule of improper purpose can be a valuable adjunct in insuring more effective control, but only if it is not interpreted so narrowly that it is all but impossible to show a violation of it.
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